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

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McKINLEY'S RECORD.

A REVIEW OF HIS CAREER IN PUBLIC LIFE.

The Weakness of His Financial Position in Congress, and His Lack of Capacity as Governor of Ohio.

EDITORIALS AND LETTERS FROM THE EVENING POST.

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GIFT
of H. L. Leupp

McKINLEY'S FINANCIAL RECORD.

Favored Free Coinage of Silver in 1877.

On the 5th of November, 1877, Mr. Bland of Missouri moved in the House of Representatives to suspend the rules and pass a bill to authorize the free coinage of the standard silver dollar. On the call of the roll Mr. McKinley voted yea.

Opposed Hayes's Veto of the Bland-Allison Act in 1878.

The Bland bill was amended in the Senate, under the lead of Mr. Allison, so as to provide for the coinage of not less than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 worth of silver bullion a month into standard dollars, and in that form passed the House. President Hayes vetoed the bill February 28, 1878. On the question of repassing the bill over the veto Mr. McKinley voted yea.

Condemned Cleveland in 1888 for Urging Repeal of the Act Vetoed by Hayes.

Mr. McKinley was chairman of the committee on resolutions in the Republican national convention of 1888, and reported a platform which declared that "the Republican party is in favor of the use of both gold and silver as money, and condemns the policy of the Democratic administration in its efforts to demonetize silver"—these efforts consisting of recommendations by President Cleveland that Congress should repeal the Bland-Allison act, precisely like the recommendations made by Mr. Cleveland's Republican predecessor, President Arthur.

Advocated Larger Silver Purchases in 1890.

Mr. McKinley, as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and leader of the House in the Fifty-first Congress, earnestly advocated the passage of the silver-purchase act in 1890 as better than the Bland Allison act and the next best thing to free coinage, saying of it: "We cannot have free coinage now, except in the manner provided in the bill. To defeat this bill means to defeat all silver legislation and to leave us with two millions a month only, when by passing this bill we would have four and a half millions a month of Treasury notes as good as gold."

HIS PLATFORM NOW.

The Financial Resolution Adopted by the Ohio Republican Convention.

We contend for honest money, for a currency of gold, silver and paper with which to measure our exchanges that shall be as sound as the government and as untarnished as its honor; and to that end we favor bimetallism and demand the use of both gold and silver as standard money, either in accordance with a ratio to be fixed by an international agreement (if that can be obtained), or under such restrictions and such provisions to be determined by legislation as will secure the maintenance of the parities of value of the two metals, so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar, whether of silver, gold, or paper, shall be at all times equal.

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EDITORIALS FROM THE EVENING POST.

OHIO'S CANDIDATE IN 1876 AND IN 1896.

JOE MANLEY recently made an interesting and instructive comparison between the situation a few weeks before the Republican convention of 1876 and the outlook to-day, to show that the candidate who leads two months before the delegates meet, as McKinley does now, may fail to secure the nomination, as Blaine failed twenty years ago. There is, however, a contrast between the situation in 1876 and that in 1896, which is much more important than Manley's suggestion.

Twenty years ago, as now, Ohio entered a "favorite son" in the contest for the Republican nomination. Twenty years ago the Ohio candidate was successful in the convention, and the Electoral Commission awarded him the presidency. The national convention of 1896 is still a number of weeks away, but the Ohio candidate is far ahead of all his rivals, and his success is confidently claimed.

In one respect, however, and that the most important of all, William McKinley in 1896 is as far removed from Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 as one pole from the other. The Ohio candidate twenty years ago was so sound on the financial issue that nobody in the country could question his position. The Ohio candidate now is so vague and enigmatical in his outgivings that nobody can tell what he means.

Mr. Hayes came into national prominence through his election as Governor of Ohio in 1875, after the most interesting, exciting, and important state canvass known in the country for many years. The nation was then suffering at once from the business depression that followed the panic of 1873 and from the demoralizing effects of a depreciated currency. The Democratic managers in Ohio, and indeed throughout the country generally, except in the extreme East, thought that inflation of the currency would prove the most popular policy on which to run a campaign. They therefore renominated the veteran "Rise-up William" Allen for Governor on a platform which declared that the contraction of the currency already made by the Republican party, and the further contraction proposed by it, with a view to the resumption of specie payments, had brought disaster to the business of the country and threatened general bankruptcy; and made the "demand that this policy be abandoned and that the volume of currency be made and kept equal to the wants of trade, leaving the restoration of legal-tenders to par, gold, to be brought about by promoting the industries of the people, and not by destroying them."

The Republican convention adopted a guarded declaration that "a policy of finance should be steadily pursued which, without unnecessary shock to business or trade, will ultimately equalize the purchasing capacity of the coin and paper dollar." This represented the cowardice of many Republican politicians, and after the nomination of Mr. Hayes he was appealed to by many of his party friends not to oppose an increase of the paper currency. But he refused to make any compromise, and sounded the real keynote of the canvass in his first deliverance, when he came

out openly and boldly for honest money and against inflation. The campaign attracted the attention of the whole country for months, and the success of Mr. Hayes in what was then a doubtful state brought him immediately within the range of possible choice for the national convention the next summer.

Mr. Hayes continued as outspoken and emphatic on the financial issue after his election to the governorship as before. In March, 1876, he wrote Gen. Garfield that "the previous question will again be irredeemable paper as a permanent policy, or a policy which seeks a return to coin," and added that "my opinion is decidedly against yielding a hair-breadth." The Republican national convention met the issue squarely. Its platform recalled the fact that in the first act of Congress signed by President Grant the national government assumed to remove any doubts of its purpose to discharge all just obligations to the public creditors by solemnly pledging its faith to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the United States notes in coin, and declared that "commercial prosperity, public morals, and national credit demand that this promise be fulfilled by a continuous and steady progress to specie payment." Gov. Hayes warmly endorsed this plank in his letter of acceptance, speaking as follows:

"It is my conviction that the feeling of uncertainty inseparable from an irredeemable paper currency, with its fluctuations of value, is one of the great obstacles to a revival of confidence and business, and to a return of prosperity. That uncertainty can be ended in but one way - the resumption of specie payments. But the longer the instability of our money system is permitted to continue, the greater will be the injury inflicted upon our economical interests and all classes of society. If elected, I shall approve every appropriate measure to accomplish the desired end; and shall oppose anystep backward."

President Hayes's financial views were put to the test within a few months after his inauguration. He convened Congress in extra session on the 15th of October, 1877. On the 5th of November Mr. Bland of Missouri carried through the House, by a vote of 164 to 34, a motion to suspend the rules and pass "an act to authorize the free coinage of the standard silver dollar, and to restore its legal-tender character." During the following winter the Senate amended the bill so as to provide for the coinage of silver dollars to the amount of not less than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 a month. On the 28th of February, 1878, Mr. Hayes vetoed this bill in a most effective message, on the ground that, "if the country is to be benefited by a silver coinage, it can be done only by the issue of silver dollars of full value, which will defraud no man"; and he declared that "a currency worth less than it purports to be worth will in the end defraud not only creditors, but all who are engaged in legitimate business, and none more surely than those who are dependent on their daily labor for their daily bread."

Such was the financial record of the Ohio candidate of 1876—a record of which any man might be proud. By a curious coincidence the Ohio candidate of 1896 entered Congress at the same time that Mr. Hayes became President. The first test of Mr. McKinley's financial soundness came on the 5th of November, 1877, and he responded by voting with Mr. Bland for the free coinage of silver. The second test came on the 28th of February, 1878, when the question was whether the Bland-Allison bill should be passed over the veto of the Republican President, and again Mr. McKinley followed the lead of Bland, helping to make up the more than two-thirds majority that overrode the representative of his own state and of his own party in the White House. The McKinley of 1896 is con-

sistent with the McKinley of 1877 and 1878, standing as he now does on a platform that favors an undefined "bimetallism" and the coinage of silver under restrictions and provisions "to be determined by legislation," which holds out the hope that the Ohio candidate of 1896 would not veto any currency act that should get through Congress.

Can the Republican party afford to go into the campaign of this year under a candidate who began public life as the advocate of free coinage and whose position on the silver question, after twenty years of service, is so vague that nobody knows how he stands today?

PRESIDENTS AND THE FINANCES.

It is now thirty years since, directly after the close of the civil war, the first attempt was made to commit the country to a depreciated currency by paying government bonds in greenbacks instead of gold. The Democrats took up the idea with enthusiasm in 1868, and put a plank in their platform demanding "one currency for the government and the people, the laborer and the office-holder, the pensioner and the soldier, the producer and the bondholder," and another declaring that, "where the obligations of the government do not expressly state upon their face, or the law under which they were issued does not provide that they shall be paid in coin, they ought, in right and justice, to be paid in the lawful money of the United States." The Republicans met the issue squarely, and adopted a resolution that "we denounce all forms of repudiation as a national crime; and the national honor requires the payment of the public indebtedness in the uttermost good faith to all creditors at home and abroad, not only according to the letter but the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted." Gen. Grant's election by an overwhelming majority upon this platform settled the question, once for all.

The next attempt of the soft-money men was to inflate the currency by the act of 1874. This was blocked by the veto message which President Grant sent the Senate on the 22d of April in that year, and in which he said:

"The theory, in my belief, is a departure from true principles of finance, national interest, national obligations to creditors, Congressional promises, party pledges on the part of both political parties, and of personal views and promises made by me in every annual message sent to Congress and in each inaugural address."

The next movement of the soft-money men in Congress was to secure the free coinage of silver at the first session after Gen. Grant surrendered the presidency to Mr. Hayes. Both branches were then more thoroughly given over to wild ideas on the finances than ever before or since. Mr. Bland's motion on the fifth of November, 1877, to pass a free-coinage act was favored by 164 members of the House, and opposed by only 34, all but ten of whom came from the Northeastern section, comprising New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Senate, under the lead of Mr. Allison, transformed this into a bill providing for the purchase of silver bullion and its coinage into silver dollars of not less than $2,000,000 worth nor more than $4,000,000 worth per month. Again, as four years before, the President stood up for the national honor, and Mr. Hayes sent in a veto, which unhappily was not sustained by Congress, as Gen. Grant's had been, but which redounds more and more to his honor as the years pass and justify his warning:

"It is my firm conviction that, if the country is to be benefited by a silver coinage, it can be done only by the issue of silver dollars of full value, which will defraud no man. A currency worth less than it purports to be worth will in the end defraud not only creditors, but all

who are engaged in legitimate business, and none more surely than those who are dependent on their daily labor for their daily bread."

Mr. Hayes was succeeded in the presidency by Gen. Garfield. He had stoutly opposed the soft-money tendencies in Ohio, and as a member of the House had voted against free coinage and in favor of sustaining Mr. Hayes's veto of the Bland-Allison act. In his letter of acceptance he gave further assurance that he could be depended upon to stand for sound money by declaring against "any violent changes or doubtful financial experiments."

The assassination of Garfield made Arthur President for nearly three years and a half. In his letter accepting the nomination for Vice-President he had come out boldly for the gold standard as follows:

"Our paper currency is now as good as gold, and silver is performing its legitimate function for the purpose of change. The principles which should govern the relations of these elements of the currency are simple and clear. There must be no deteriorated coin, no depreciated paper, and every dollar, whether of metal or paper, should stand the test of the world's fixed standard."

In conformity with these ideas, Mr. Arthur threw the influence of his administration in favor of repealing the Bland-Allison act. "I concur with the Secretary of the Treasury," he said in his last annual message to Congress, "in recommending the immediate suspension of the coinage of silver dollars and of the issuance of silver certificates."

Mr. Cleveland was fully committed to the same position regarding the sacredness of the government's financial obligations and the soundness of the currency that had been maintained by Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur. In his first annual message to Congress he recommended the suspension of the compulsory coinage of silver dollars, and throughout his first term he stood as a rock against all schemes for the depreciation of the currency.

Thus for twenty years the executive department of the government had been the firm reliance of the people against all the attempts of the soft-money men to have their way. With the election of 1888 came a change. Mr. Harrison, the successful candidate in that year, came from a state which had in the past been given over to inflation and free coinage; he had endorsed the Bland-Allison act; he was nominated upon a platform which, for the first time in the history of the party, aroused doubt as to its attitude; and he evaded the issue in his letter of acceptance. The result was that, when the free-coinage men attempted in 1890 to put through a bill incorporating their ideas, the gravest apprehensions were felt that he would give such a measure his approval, and the silver-purchase act was devised as the only defence against such rashness. Senator Sherman, the nominal author of the act, has left this statement of the situation at that time on record in his 'Recollections':

"A large majority of the Senate favored free silver, and it was feared that the small majority against it in the other house might yield and agree to it. The silence of the President on the matter gave rise to an apprehension that, if a free-coinage bill should pass both houses, he would not feel at liberty to veto it. Some action had to be taken to prevent a return to free silver coinage, and the measure evolved was the best obtainable. I voted for it, but the day it became a law I was ready to repeal it, if repeal could be had without substituting in its place absolute free coinage."

The election of 1892 again placed the executive department in the hands of a man who could be implicitly depended upon to protect the country against all wild financial schemes. During the first year of his administration Mr. Cleveland carried through the repeal of the silver-purchase act, and

vetoed a bill to coin the seigniorage; and thus stopped all coinage of silver, for the first time since 1878.

This review shows that, with a single exception, all of the Presidents elected since the civil war have been sound-money men of the strictest sort; and that the result of breaking this rule in 1888 was the passage in 1890 of an act so bad that within three years Congress had to be convened in special session to secure its repeal. In other words, the country has tried both policies—choosing Presidents whose financial position was known and whose financial position was doubtful. Can the nation afford in 1896 to elect a President who entered public life twenty years ago to vote at the first opportunity for free coinage and to override President Hayes's veto of the Bland-Allison act; who, as leader of the House six years ago, strenuously urged the passage of the silver-purchase act as the next best thing to free coinage; and who this year takes refuge in declaring his adherence to a "bimetallism" which he does not define and which conceals nobody knows what wild scheme?

"IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE."

In his first term as a member of Congress McKinley voted for the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 in 1877, and to override President Hayes's veto of the Bland-Allison act in 1878. As leader of the House a dozen years later he earnestly advocated the passage of the silver-purchase act in 1890, on the ground that "we cannot have free coinage now, except in the manner provided in the bill."

The advocates of McKinley's nomination for the presidency have only one way of meeting the disclosure of these ugly facts. They excuse the course of their favorite in each instance by the plea that he was no worse than his party or than public sentiment. As the Chicago *Inter Ocean* puts it:

> "McKinley's record in Congress on the silver question really shows that he was in happy accord with a great majority of the Republican party on that as well as on other great questions. He was not only with the vast majority of the Republican party, but he showed himself to be moving in close contact with the general public sentiment of the country—showed himself to be in close touch with the people."

In this argument the supporters of McKinley have touched the lowest level that can be reached in urging the claims of an aspirant for the presidency. They maintain, and seem glad to maintain, that their favorite is a man without a spark of that statesmanlike foresight which enables its possessor to discern the dangers of a popular craze that for the moment sweeps everything before it. They boast that the first aim of their candidate while he was a member of Congress was to learn what the prevailing sentiment of the public at the moment of voting was, and then to array himself on that side. Their argument logically leads to the conclusion that, if he were elected President, he would not interpose the executive veto against the enactment of the most dangerous bill passed by Congress, because, if he took such an attitude, he would no longer be "in close touch with the people."

The framers of the constitution would have been amazed to hear such a plea, that the President of the United States should be nothing more than the mere recorder and endorser of fleeting public sentiment. One chief reason for vesting him with the veto power was that he might stand as a bulwark against this danger. Hamilton says in the 'Federalist' of this prerogative:

> "The power in question not only serves as a shield to the executive [from encroachments upon his power by the legislative department], but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salu-

tary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the executive, but upon the supposition that the Legislature will not be infallible; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest."

The theory of the veto power is that the President may save the nation from disaster in a crisis by refusing to keep "in close touch with the people," by opposing what seems to be the prevailing public sentiment. As a rule, our Presidents have lived up to the theory of the constitution in this respect, and in every such case history has justified their action. When they have fallen to the lower level of not opposing any popular craze, the nation has always suffered.

When Congress passed the inflation act in 1874, public sentiment appeared to favor it, and a majority of the Republican Senators earnestly supported it, among them such powerful leaders as Cameron of Pennsylvania, Morton of Indiana, and Logan of Illinois. A President whose prime object was to keep "in close touch with the people" would have signed the bill without the slightest hesitation. What saved the nation from a frightful disaster was the fact that General Grant recognized "true principles of finance, national interest, national obligation to creditors" as superior to what might prove, and did prove, an "impulse unfriendly to the public good," such as the framers of the constitution had foreseen.

When another of these dangerous impulses was felt in Congress sixteen years later, the incumbent of the White House was unfortunately a man who lacked General Grant's courage. In 1890 the passage of a free-coinage act was threatened, and Senator Sherman and other Republicans who opposed that policy were made apprehensive by Mr. Harrison's silence that he would not feel at liberty to veto such a bill if it should pass. "Some action," says Mr. Sherman, "had to be taken to prevent a return to free silver coinage, and the measure evolved was the best obtainable." The silver-purchase act, the operation of which within three years compelled the calling of a special session of Congress to secure its repeal, was thus due to the weakness of a President who could not be depended upon to resist the passion of the hour.

McKinley's record on the currency question is bad enough. But the defence of that record on the ground that he was in line with his party, and the advocacy of his election to the presidency because he will always try to be in close contact with public sentiment, uncover fresh perils to the country from his successful candidacy. An executive whose highest aim is always to be "in close touch with the people" is to be dreaded, as a constant menace to the safety of the nation.

PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND CURRENCY.

IT is of the first importance to the nation that the next administration shall be one which can be depended upon to play no pranks with the cur-

rency. Whether that administration shall be Republican or Democratic is a matter of far less consequence than whether it shall stand for sound money.

As the Republican convention will be held a month before the Democratic, public attention is now chiefly concentrated upon the attitude to be taken by the former convention regarding the financial issue. That attitude will be largely determined by the record of the candidate for President who shall be nominated. Indeed, the confidence of the public in the stability of a Republican administration may practically depend upon whether a man shall be chosen who has shown that he can always be depended upon to stand out against financial follies.

It is sometimes urged that the general attitude of the respective parties is the most important element in the case, and that presidential candidate and platform are of secondary consequence. "I do not attach very much weight to platforms or candidates," remarked a prominent Republican Congressman the other day. "The really important thing is the general tendency of the two parties. As regards free silver coinage, for example, or any other aspect of the currency question, the thing to look at is which party in Congress casts the larger proportion of votes on the right side. That is the party to be trusted."

This theory sounds plausible, but it does not accord with the experience of the nation as shown in more than one emergency during the past quarter of a century. Over and over again the country has found that its preservation from financial perils depended, not upon which party had control of Congress, but upon the foresight and courage of the executive.

Gen. Grant was re-elected to the presidency in 1872 upon a platform which denounced repudiation of the public debt, in any form or disguise, as a national crime, and expressed a confident expectation of a speedy resumption of specie payment. The House of Representatives elected at the same time was Republican by more than two to one and the Republican majority in the Senate was almost as great. Nevertheless, this Congress, under the influence of the hard times following the panic of 1873, passed in the spring of 1874 an inflation bill which involved a tampering with national obligations and would indefinitely have postponed resumption. Only the veto of President Grant then saved the country.

The first Congress under President Hayes was Democratic in its lower branch and almost equally divided between the two parties in the Senate. The slow recovery of the country from the business depression that followed the panic kept alive the demand for the repeal of the resumption act, which was favored by many Republicans in Congress, as well as by most of the Democrats. Test votes in the House during the autumn of 1877 showed that a bill for such repeal could pass the lower branch, and the concurrence of the Senate was to be feared. The movement failed, however, because it became known that the President would block it by his veto. The knowledge that Mr. Hayes was sound upon this issue saved the country from the threatened peril.

In 1890 the Republicans controlled presidency, Senate, and House together, for the first time in many years. The feeling in favor of silver was so strong in the Senate that a free-coinage act could be easily passed, and the advocates of such a measure hoped that they could carry it through the House. For weeks the country remained in uncertainty what to expect, because nobody felt any assurance that President Harrison would interpose his objection to the enactment of a free-coinage act if it could be got through Congress. That mischievous and disastrous compromise, the silver-purchase act, was finally devised and passed for the simple rea-

son, as Senator Sherman has declared, that "the silence of the President on the matter gave rise to an apprehension that, if a free-coinage bill should pass both houses, he would not feel at liberty to veto it"; and that "some action had to be taken to prevent a return to free-silver coinage, and the measure evolved was the best obtainable." In this case the fact that the President could not be depended upon involved the country in all the misfortunes that followed the passage of the Sherman act.

Within three years came a panic to which the policy embodied in the silver-purchase act had powerfully contributed. The initiative rested with the President. Mr. Cleveland convened Congress in extra session for the express purpose of repealing this act, his proclamation reciting that "the present perilous condition is largely the result of a financial policy which the executive branch of the government finds embodied in unwise laws which must be executed until repealed by Congress." By his firmness Mr. Cleveland extorted from a reluctant Congress the repeal of the Sherman act, and thus set the nation on the road to financial recovery.

We do not need to multiply such illustrations. The four cases which we have cited show the supreme importance of having a President who is sound. Such a President saved the country from inflation in 1874, and from the repeal of the resumption act in 1877. Such a President was the salvation of the nation in 1893. The lack of such a President in 1890 involved the country in a disastrous policy.

The great objection to McKinley as President is that nobody feels any confidence in his financial soundness. He voted for free coinage in 1877, and for the silver-purchase act as the next best thing to free coinage in 1890. Nobody would argue for a moment that he would have vetoed the inflation act if he had been in the White House, instead of Grant, in 1874, or would have prevented the repeal of the resumption act if he had been in Hayes's place in 1877. The business interests of the United States should not be subjected to the terrible risks involved in a President who cannot be depended upon.

"DETERMINED BY LEGISLATION."

PUBLIC attention has been chiefly fixed upon that part of McKinley's financial platform which advocates "bimetallism" and the idea of a double standard. There is another feature of the resolution adopted by the Republican state convention in Ohio last March that should not escape notice. We refer to the implied pledge that, as President of the United States, McKinley would not veto any act regarding silver that might be passed by Congress. This pledge is found in the words italicized below:

"We contend for honest money, for a currency of gold, silver, and paper with which to measure our exchanges that shall be as sound as the government and as untarnished as its honor; and to that end we favor bimetallism and demand the use of both gold and silver as standard money, either in accordance with a ratio to be fixed by an international agreement (if that can be obtained) or *under such restrictions and such provisions to be determined by legislation* as will secure the maintenance of the parities of values of the two metals, so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar, whether of silver, gold, or paper, shall be at all times equal."

The meaning of any expression is determined not only by its ordinary signification, but also by the special circumstances under which it is employed. "Legislation," according to the dictionaries, means the exercise of the power of legislating, or the product of such legislative action. In most of the states the executive has something to say about legislation, as he may veto a bill,

and it can then become a law only by repassage, and usually by a two-thirds vote. But in Ohio the Governor has never possessed any such check upon the process of law-making. "Legislation" as it has always been in Ohio, means the passage of a bill by both branches of the legislative department.

The character of the man who stands on the Ohio platform shows that the phrase "to be determined by legislation" would inevitably mean in McKinley's case the application to federal affairs of the system in his own state by which the executive does not meddle with the action of the legislative body. No man as President will ever exercise the veto power unless he be by nature a man of strong convictions and great independence. Such an act subjects him to the imputation of "setting himself up as knowing more than Congress," and of "defeating the will of a majority of the people's representatives."

McKinley entered public life by election to the lower branch of Congress twenty years ago. During that long period he has never given a single exhibition of independence. On the contrary, from first to last his conduct has been that of a man whose sole aim was to be "in close touch with the people," whether it seemed to him that the people favored the free coinage of silver, as in 1877, and the purchase of silver bullion, as in 1890, or opposed free coinage, as when he was on the stump in 1891. An elaborate biography of this Ohio Napoleon has been published, but it cites no case where he showed the qualities of a commander in leading his forces into action or restraining impetuous subordinates from dashing into danger. His very nature shows that as executive of the United States he would be only what the executive of Ohio is as regards legislation, a nonentity, and that any silver measure which could be pushed through Congress would be sure of becoming a law.

There are people who believe in the theory of a President who will pledge himself not to veto a silver bill, or who is known to be so weak-backed that such a pledge is not necessary. Ex-Lieutenant-Governor Black of Pennsylvania came out the other day in favor of an agreement that "our [Democratic] candidate for President is not, if elected, to interpose his veto to embarrass or defeat any financial legislation which may be sent him by the votes of a majority of the Democratic members of Congress." Senator Jones of Arkansas endorses this proposition, and would have the Democratic convention declare explicitly against any use of the veto power "except in cases involving constitutional questions or for the purpose of checking hasty and impulsive legislation."

But a week's discussion proved long enough to show that such a policy would be rejected with contempt by the people. Senator Jones is of the opinion that the people resent the use of the veto power. The truth is that the history of the country for the past quarter of a century shows that the people regard the veto power as one of the greatest safeguards of our government, and that nothing strengthens a candidate for executive office more than the knowledge that he is strong enough to use this power. It was the veto power alone that saved the nation from a terrible financial disaster when a Republican President in 1874 thus blocked the enactment of an inflation bill passed by an overwhelmingly Republican Congress, and no other act in his civil career gave General Grant such a hold upon the respect of the people. It was the assurance that Cleveland would use this power, if necessary, to block any dangerous silver legislation that brought him the support of the business community in 1892, and swelled his majorities to such large proportions.

The election of McKinley as Presi-

dent would mean the occupancy of the executive chair for four years by a man who would never be a check upon the legislative body, and whose signature could be counted upon for any bill that was passed by a majority of "the people's representatives." A McKinley in Grant's place in 1874 would have set the nation back a quarter of a century. A President with the independence that Grant showed in 1874 may be quite as necessary to the safety of the country from 1897 to 1901.

McKINLEY'S WEAKNESS.

THERE are gratifying signs that the weakness of McKinley as a presidential candidate, because of his record and present position on the financial question, is coming to be generally realized by thoughtful Republicans. The canvass for his nomination at St. Louis is fast changing from an enthusiastic movement for the champion of protection to a defensive campaign, which seeks to excuse his admitted shuffling in the past and his vagueness now on the far more vital question of the currency.

Gen. H. V. Boynton is one of the most intelligent and candid observers of public sentiment among the Washington correspondents. Writing to the Cincinnati *Commercial Gazette*, the leading Republican newspaper in McKinley's state, he reports that "there is a growing belief here, which has already become a conviction in many minds, that New England, New York, and New Jersey cannot be carried for the Republicans on the Ohio money platform"; while, on the other hand, "the silver leaders have not been captured or even conciliated by it." Of the outlook for the national convention he says:

"The firm belief is that the St. Louis platform will give no uncertain sound in its plank defining the relations between gold and silver. If this occurs, it will be awkward for Ohio, and as matters now stand, embarrassing for Ohio's candidate. If it does not occur, the Democrats are likely to join issue at Chicago with a straight-out sound-money plank. In that case he would be a bold prophet who would declare that Republican success was assured. The campaign would be defensive from the start. Under present conditions such might easily be a losing campaign."

The supporters of McKinley in the press betray a growing apprehension of the bad effect produced by the disclosure of his financial record, and make feeble attempts to explain it away. The Chicago *Evening Post*, for example, wants to know why, in compiling McKinley's financial record, we did not quote a stump speech that he delivered at Niles, Ohio, in August, 1891, when he declared himself against free coinage and argued that the adoption of this policy would be disastrous to the country. Simply because such a campaign speech is of no consequence in estimating McKinley's fitness for the presidency. It meant only that at that time he thought free coinage was not popular. One of his chief journalistic defenders has said, with entire truth, that "McKinley's record in Congress on the silver question showed him to be moving in close contact with the general public sentiment of the country, to be in close touch with the people." If public sentiment in Ohio in August, 1891, had seemed favorable to free coinage, McKinley would undoubtedly not have opposed it, but would have advocated it and "would have pointed with pride" to his course in Congress in June, 1890, when, as chairman of the ways and means committee and leader of the House, he earnestly advocated the passage of the silver-purchase act as better than the Bland-Allison act, and the next best thing to free coinage, saying of it:

"We cannot have free coinage now, except in the manner provided in the bill.

To defeat this bill means to defeat all silver legislation and to leave us with two millions a month only, when by passing this bill we would have four and a half millions a month of Treasury notes as good as gold."

Nobody cares what may have been said on the stump in 1891 by a man whose attitude at any time only reflects his conception of what is for the moment the most popular policy with the majority. The important thing about an aspirant for the presidency is his previous official record and the platform on which he seeks the office. McKinley voted for free coinage outright as a member of Congress in 1877, and for the silver-purchase act as the nearest thing to free coinage that could be secured in 1890. He asks the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1896, on a platform which declares that "we favor bimetallism and demand the use of both gold and silver as standard money," and which would secure this impracticable double standard either by international action, if that can be obtained, as everybody knows it cannot be, "or under such restrictions and such provisions, to be determined by legislation, as will secure the maintenance of the parities of values of the two metals"—a provision which would allow him as President to sign another such dangerous act as he sent to Harrison for his signature six years ago.

A childish defense of McKinley is made by another Chicago newspaper, the *Times-Herald*, which quotes from a speech delivered by him in the fall of 1892, in which he said that free coinage would be bad, and excuses his dilatoriness in reaching this position by the plea that "the real scope of the baleful effects of unlimited coinage of silver was not perceived until 1892." Perhaps not by McKinley, but the baleful effects of coining no more than $2,000,000 worth a month of short-weight silver dollars were clearly perceived by Hayes when he vetoed the act for which McKinley voted in 1878, on the ground that "a currency worth less than it purports to be worth will in the end defraud not only creditors, but all who are engaged in legitimate business"; by Arthur from 1881 to 1884, when he each year urged Congress to repeal this limited-coinage act because of the disasters that it threatened; and by Cleveland in February, 1885, when he wrote the Warner letter urging upon the Democrats in Congress the duty of immediately suspending silver coinage because a continuance of the policy would inevitably bring the terrible financial crisis that finally came. We cannot afford to have as President a man who did not discover until 1891 or 1892 the danger that was plain to Hayes in 1878, to Arthur in 1881–4, and to Cleveland in 1885.

The final argument upon which the defenders of McKinley fall back is the assertion, as made by the New York *Tribune* the other day, that "the people know they can trust the Republican party, whether one man be elected President or another"; and that, "if the money question alone were to be considered, the country would be safer by far in the hands of a Republican Congress, even with the least trustworthy of all the Republican candidates elected President, than it would be in the hands of a Democratic Congress with the best President that party could possibly select." But this assertion is easily disproved by a reference to recent history. It was an overwhelmingly Republican Congress which passed the inflation act of 1874; and a McKinley in the White House would have signed that act without question. On the other hand, while a Democratic Congress passed the bill to coin the seigniorage in 1894, the country knew that it was safe because Cleveland could be trusted to imitate Grant's example of twenty years before and

block the scheme by the use of the veto power.

The more the McKinley organs try to explain and excuse away the financial record of the Ohio man, the more plain do they make his lack both of common sense and of backbone. His advocates are now exposing his weakness so clearly that everybody can see it.

THE WAY TO BEAT McKINLEY.

Two months before the Republican national convention of 1896 the chances seem to favor the nomination of William McKinley for the presidency. Two months before the corresponding convention in 1876 the chances seemed to favor the nomination of James G. Blaine. The nomination of Blaine, nevertheless, was prevented in 1876. The nomination of McKinley can be prevented in 1896.

Twenty years ago "favorite sons" were entered by several states—Conkling by New York, Jewell by Connecticut, Hartranft by Pennsylvania, Hayes by Ohio, Morton by Indiana, and Bristow by Kentucky. This year the leader is also opposed by local favorites—Reed of Maine, Morton of New York, Quay of Pennsylvania, Allison of Iowa, Cullom of Illinois, and Bradley of Kentucky. In 1876 one of the favorite sons finally came in ahead of the man who was the leader at the start.

What beat Blaine twenty years ago, however, was not the fact that the Republican managers in many states opposed his nomination. It did not hurt him with the masses of the party that Conkling was against him in New York, Cameron in Pennsylvania, and Morton in Indiana. What prevented the convention from nominating him was the fact that a strong element of conservative men considered him an unworthy and dangerous leader. His defeat was foreshadowed when the Massachusetts Republican state convention elected as delegates-at-large Richard H. Dana, Jr., E. Rockwood Hoar, John M. Forbes, and President Chadbourne of Williams College, and adopted this resolution:

"That this convention leaves the delegates of Massachusetts to the Republican national convention unpledged and uninstructed in respect of individual candidates for President and Vice-President of the United States; but expects and requires them each and all to work and vote for those candidates, and those only, whose character and career give unquestionable assurance to the whole country that they will be faithful and zealous to maintain the equal rights of all citizens under the constitution; to bring about the resumption of specie payments at a day not later than that already fixed by law, and to effect a thorough and radical reform in the civil service, to the end that the administration of public affairs may be characterized by efficiency, economy, and purity."

Conkling and Cameron and Morton and the rest of the party bosses could not by themselves have beaten Blaine in 1876. Platt and Quay and Clarkson and the other bosses of to-day who oppose McKinley cannot by themselves beat the Ohio candidate now. But there is an element in the Republican party which can again turn the scales if it will. The men who want, first of all, a President who is safe, a President upon whom they can depend in any financial emergency, can yet prevent the nomination of McKinley if they exert their power.

We publish elsewhere a brief summary of McKinley's financial record, and we beg every business man to study it with attention. It shows that in his first year of his congressional service he voted for the free coinage of silver; that the next year he voted against sustaining President Hayes's veto of the Bland-Allison act; that ten years later he condemned Cleveland for urging the repeal of the act vetoed by Hayes; and that in his last term as a Representative he advocated the silver-

purchase act as the next best thing to free coinage, and better than the Bland-Allison act because it provided a market for more silver.

McKinley was wrong on the tariff issue when he was in Congress, and would be wrong as President. But that is a matter of little consequence compared with the financial issue. The country can stand another high tariff if it must come, and it might come with any Republican in the White House. But it cannot stand four years of doubt and uncertainty as to the President's position regarding the currency; four years during which it would always dread that the executive might sign a free-coinage act if it could be got through Congress, or encourage the framing of another "cowardly compromise," like the silver-purchase act devised by Senator Sherman in 1890, "to prevent a return to free silver coinage," which, he says, was then threatened by the silence of President Harrison.

No defence is possible of McKinley's financial record. None is attempted by his supporters beyond the plea, to quote from the Chicago *Inter Ocean*, that "he was in happy accord with a great majority of the Republican party," was "moving in close contact with the general public sentiment of the country," and "showed himself to be in close touch with the people." His most earnest advocates thus admit that he is a man who utterly lacks independence and courage, and whose first aim as President would be to learn what policy seemed to be most popular. It is enough to make every business man in the country shudder to think of having such a man in the White House for four years.

Hitherto we have always had Presidents, whether Republican or Democratic, who were sound on the financial issue, with the single exception of Harrison's weakness in the summer of 1890. For that temporary weakness the country paid dearly, and the debt is not yet liquidated. McKinley as President means four years of Harrison at his weakest. It is an appalling prospect. The nation ought to be saved from it, and can be saved. Let the business men among the Republicans of New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, and every other city of the country at once organize their forces and insist that, whoever the candidate of the St. Louis convention may be, he must not be the man whose record would make his election usher in four years of doubt as to the safety of our currency system.

THE ROAD TO VICTORY.

THE first essential to the restoration of prosperity in the United States is assurance of the stability of the currency. Such assurance has not existed for years. The lack of it was the chief cause for the panic of 1893, and continues the main reason for the prolongation of the business depression.

What threatens the stability of the currency is the demand of a large element among the voters for the free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, which would involve the substitution of the silver standard for the gold one; and the readiness of prominent politicians in each party, including the leading Republican candidate for the presidency, to compromise with this dishonest demand by favoring a "bimetallism" that is necessarily incompatible with the maintenance of the gold standard. The election as President of a man whose record makes such a platform the only one on which he could consistently run, would mean four years of constant apprehension as to the safety of our financial system.

The one sure way of averting this peril is the election of a man who can be trusted, upon a platform which pledges his party against free coinage and for the maintenance of the gold

standard. Such a result would establish the credit of the nation beyond question, and this would of itself introduce a period of great prosperity. Secretary Smith of the Interior Department has expressed the opinion that "the nomination and election by either party of a sound-money man, on a platform declaring briefly and clearly that the dollar of this country should consist of 25.8 grains of gold, and that no legislation should be undertaken to depreciate this dollar, would increase business values in the United States 25 per cent. at once." We believe that this is an underestimate of the good that would be accomplished.

During the summer of 1868 gold ranged at a premium of between 40 and 50. There was an active agitation for the payment of government bonds in the depreciated greenback currency. Butler in the Republican party and Pendleton in the Democratic advocated the adoption of the policy. Pendleton carried his party with him, and secured the adoption of a platform by the Democratic national convention which declared that "where the obligations of the government do not expressly state upon their face, or the law under which they were issued does not provide that they shall be paid in coin, they ought, in right and in justice, to be paid in the lawful money of the United States"—meaning greenbacks, instead of gold, the only coin then current; demanded taxation of government bonds; and raised the clap-trap cry of "one currency for the government and the people, the laborer and the office-holder, the pensioner and the soldier, the producer and the bondholder."

The Republicans snubbed Butler, and nominated Grant upon a platform which contained this clear and explicit declaration in favor of paying the bonds in gold:

"We denounce all forms of repudiation as a national crime; and the national honor requires the payment of the public indebtedness in the uttermost good faith to all creditors at home and abroad, not only according to the letter, but the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted."

Although Seymour, whom the Democrats nominated, did not believe in the greenback policy, he "stood upon the platform" and declared, in accepting the nomination, that "the resolutions are in accord with my views." The issue therefore entered into the canvass, and resulted in a strong movement by business men to defeat the Democrats on this ground. Only New York and New Jersey of all the Northern states were returned for Seymour, and his majority in the latter was small, while the count of New York for him has always been considered fraudulent by many.

The first act passed by Congress a fortnight after Grant's inauguration in March, 1869, was "an act to strengthen the public credit of the United States," which redeemed the pledge of the Republican platform by declaring that "the faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment in coin or its equivalent of all the obligations of the United States not bearing interest, known as United States notes, and of all the interest-bearing obligations of the United States except in cases where the law authorizing the issue of any such obligation has expressly provided that the same may be paid in lawful money or other currency than gold and silver"; and that "the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the United States notes in coin."

The consequences of this victory for sound money were immediate and lasting. The premium on gold, which had ranged between 40 and 50 during the summer before the presidential election, fell to an average of below 35 in the month after that election occurred,

and was down to 13 within a year after Grant's inauguration; while specie payments were resumed only ten years later. The Republican party, no less than the country, found that honesty was the best policy in a series of great victories, while the Democratic party has not to this day fully recovered from the discredit brought upon it by its tenderness towards repudiation nearly thirty years ago.

The Republicans can make history repeat itself this year. Bland, as a later Pendleton, will go to the national Democratic convention as the advocate of free silver coinage, and will have a large element of his party with him in this later movement for repudiation. The masses of the Republican party are sound on this issue. They are sick of "straddles" and "dodges." They are tired of the deceptive talk about "bi-metallism." They are ready to welcome as clear and emphatic a declaration for national honesty as was adopted by their party in 1868. Upon such a declaration, and with a candidate who can be trusted upon this issue as implicitly as Grant showed that he could be trusted, the Republicans can sweep the country.

The road to prosperity for party and and for country is a plain one. "He serves his party best who serves his country best." The Republicans found this to be the case in 1868. It will prove as true in 1896.

A HOME VIEW OF McKINLEY.

Ohio's Candidate as His Old Neighbors See Him.

I.

How the Major Secured the Support of His State for the Presidency.

COLUMBUS, O., April 10.

Two facts must be obvious to every one who studies the political situation in Ohio to-day: first, that Major McKinley has not his State behind him in his presidential fight, in any save the strictly mechanical sense; and second, that the so-called "harmony" which has followed the long factional feud in the Republican party in Ohio is due in a great measure to the disbelief of the anti-McKinley faction that the Major will get the nomination at St. Louis. By this is meant, not that the anti-McKinley men will be untrue to their pledges, but that the fight is regarded by them as hopeless from the start, and that the perfunctory votes which they will cast for the state's candidate will not have to be long continued.

The fact that McKinley is to have the vote of the full Ohio delegation at all is a mere matter of bargain and sale. When the Republican state convention was held last year, the terms of the bargain were struck, whereby the anti-McKinley element were to be given the governorship in exchange for a McKinley delegation to the national convention. Both sides lived up to the agreement. Bushnell was nominated by the anti-McKinleyites, and the latter responded this year by putting no obstacles in the way of the McKinley presidential boom. But any one who supposes that, because Mr. Foraker and leading members of his clan are to sit in the national convention, and go through the form of voting for McKinley when the roll of states is called, they are to-day enjoying their candidate's confidence as to his plan of campaign, or that either party to the compact is at all deceived as to the real attitude of the other, is sadly out of touch with conditions here. It is not peace, but an armed truce, which keeps McKinley at the front as the "favorite son" of his state instead of a mere ambitious factional leader; it is state pride, and not personal regard, which holds together even some parts of his own nominal following; and the pedestal upon which he has laboriously clambered is so honeycombed with apathy, distrust, and contempt that, at the first evidence of unexpected strength on the part of one of the other candidates at St. Louis, it is liable to go to pieces and drop the statuesque pseudo-Napoleon suddenly to the ground.

The secret of the feeling about McKinley here is the same that accounts for the indifference with which he is regarded at Washington, and the inability of any one there except his archangel, Grosvenor, to conceive of his nomination as a strong probability; the people in both places know him. To them there is no ideal McKinley, reeking with heroic statesmanship and exhaling an atmosphere of irreproachable virtue, such as has been conjured before the minds of the credulous populace in other parts of the country. They know the Major for a very small pattern of a man, the embodiment of mediocrity in talents, in learning, and in character; an orator whose stock in trade consists wholly of phrases, not of thoughts; a politician of the narrowest and most shifty stripe; and a self-seeker before everything else. He is sometimes spoken of as that rare specimen—a public man without enemies. But in such measure as this is true it is the evidence of his greatest weakness, not of strength. It is because he lacks the decided convictions and personal force which make enemies, that he is also to-day, after twenty-odd years of more or less conspicuous political service at home and in Washington, without admiring and devoted friends.

His antagonist in state politics, ex-Gov. Foraker, does not soar to sublime heights of statesmanship himself; but when it comes to a following who are ready to go with him through thick and thin, to share his isolation in defeat as well as his exaltation in the hour of victory, he is worth two McKinleys. At all events, every one knows where to find Foraker when a fight is on; nobody knows where to find McKinley. What is true in party politics is quite as true in business; and in spite of his idiosyncrasies, it will be found to be

a fact that Foraker has five good business men in his following to McKinley's one. Foraker's limitations are well known, and he has often a brutal frankness in putting his case; but he wears no cloak and mask. Nothing, therefore, makes the average Ohioan, who knows both men, grit his teeth so savagely as to be told that Republicans of other states sympathize more with McKinley than with Foraker because McKinley is so much the more respectable figure in American politics. The Ohioan knows better. He knows that personally and politically the two men are on a dead level, and that Foraker has at least the negative virtue of not being ashamed to expose his methods and machinery to view.

It would not surprise any one here if the renewal of hostilities, in a decorous and deprecatory way, should occur before the two factions walk into convention arm in arm; and a clash now, while it would not release the anti-McKinleyites from their bargain concerning the convention, would certainly not help bind the delegation any more firmly together.

The Foraker people will not admit that they have any second choice among the candidates; but there is very good reason to believe that this attitude is maintained out of regard for what they deem their present obligation, and that Reed would be the most likely beneficiary by the delegation's breaking in pieces after a sufficient number of ballots had been cast. It must be borne in mind that the delegation will not go on to St Louis under any definite instructions. The same motive of state pride which holds it together at the start might operate to save the vice-presidency for Ohio if it were obvious that the presidency must go elsewhere. Hence if, after a few ineffectual ballots, Reed should begin to gain votes, and an offer should come from the Reed camp to make the ticket "Reed and Bushnell," it would possibly present a temptation too strong to resist. Mr. Bushnell, it is believed, would make a much stronger run in the East to-morrow than McKinley, from the fact that he is an out-and-out gold-standard man, while McKinley has wobbled, and is still wobbling, so persistently on the money question that no one knows precisely where to place him.

II.

Flat Failure as a Business Man—The Debtor and the Machine.

CLEVELAND, O., April 11.

TURNING from Major McKinley's variegated and uncertain views on the finances of the nation to see where he stands with respect to his own, every visitor to Ohio must be impressed with the universal verdict of the Major's neighbors that he is "no business man." This remark is almost invariably accompanied with a chuckle, as if the very association of the words "McKinley" and "business" suggested a comical incongruity.

"Why," said one prominent banker to your correspondent, "he is as ignorant as a child when it comes to practical affairs. The Major's a very clever fellow, you know; I have voted for him regularly, and should hate to do him any harm or say anything harsh about him. But I wouldn't trust his business judgment to buy and sell a yellow dog. He has had to be helped, and coddled, and lifted over the hard places at every stage."

"But his friends represent him in the East as the great missionary apostle from Ohio to the business world outside."

"Every Ohio man knows better, and the managers who circulate that stuff do him a wrong, for they lead the American public to expect so much more of him than he is capable of performing. They bill him like a circus, and the people whose imagination is excited by the pictures on the fence are bound to be awfully disappointed when they get inside of the tent."

"Is he not considered at home a great business orator?"

The banker laughed. "Oh, no," said he, "we all know just what he amounts to. He is a stump politician, with a set of stock phrases, like a fisherman with a ten-jointed rod. On a big occasion he pulls out all the joints and puts them together. On small occasions he pulls out one of the joints and uses that. There is only one business subject he knows anything about—the tariff. And he doesn't know enough about that to hurt him."

"Was his failure three years ago the result of business incompetency?"

"We think it was an honest failure—that is, he didn't 'fail rich,' as the saying is. There have been reports that the money obtained by the loan of his name to Robert L. Walker went into a tin mill at Piqua, and for McKinley's benefit; but no one who knows the Major believes that. The statement has been made also, by parties who assert that they have seen the paper in bank, that some of it was not made by Walker and endorsed by McKinley, but bore McKinley's signature and Walker's endorsement; and an effort has been made to turn this circumstance to McKinley's discredit. But even supposing this to be true, it does not of itself prove anything. The notes signed by McKinley, if there were such, may have been accommodation paper, and the proceeds used, like the proceeds of the endorsed notes, for Walker's benefit alone. The

fact undoubtedly is that Walker, overwhelmed by his multitude of disappointing investments, made free use of the credit which his friend possessed through being, not a man of wealth or a man of business, but a successful political figurehead whose backers could not afford to see him go entirely under. McKinley, on his part, finding the banks willing to lend money on his name, wrote it whenever requested to do so, with the result that, in his unbusiness-like way, he heaped up debts of which he did not even keep any track, and never woke up to what he was doing till everything he had was gone, and a great deal more."

"Did not his wife's fortune make up the difference?"

"I don't think that was necessary. Mrs. McKinley did what any loyal woman would wish to do to save her husband. But his creditors did not want that sacrifice. As we understand it, a number of rich friends with a stake in his political future got together and raised by subscription enough to put him on his feet again, and more, too, and spared Mrs. McKinley her threatened sacrifice. Mr. Kohlsaat of Chicago, whose paper, the *Times-Herald*, has since become the great McKinley organ, is reputed to have been the most generous contributor to the relief fund, and Mr. Hanna, the street-railway magnate of Cleveland, who is the chief engineer or steersman of the Major's presidential boom, is said to have given a handsome sum. Other well-known names are mentioned. But the full list of contributors, and the amounts they severally subscribed, have never been published. What originally got McKinley into this trouble was a sense of obligation he felt to Mr. Walker for past favors. A similar sense of indebtedness he must now feel to the little group of party associates who helped him out of his extremity. His only hope of repaying them rests on getting into some place where he will have large political favors to dispense."

There was an incident connected with the McKinley failure to which the speaker did not allude, but which to the minds of many persons at the time infused a mild flavor of comedy into what was generally treated as a tragic episode. In a published interview at Chicago on February 21, 1893, immediately after the news of the crash appeared in the press, Mr. Kohlsaat said, referring to a conference he had had with Major McKinley:

"The Governor will retire from politics, since he cannot hold office and get up again financially. He said he would begin his law practice again, and make it his object in life to pay all he had been dragged into owing.

"Will the Governor resign? Well, it is hardly possible to see what else he can do. It will be quite necessary, since he proposes to settle dollar for dollar, and there is no money in being Governor."

At that moment McKinley was in Cleveland. Simultaneously with the giving out of the Kohlsaat interview, he was approached with the question whether the report was true that he should retire from the governorship and go to work, and he answered promptly:

"You may state that I will *not* resign my office and return to the practice of my profession."

Mr. Kohlsaat never attempted to explain the discrepancy between his own judgment of what was the right thing for a politician in such a case to do, and the plans of the politician himself. It was an ingenuous impulse which led him into giving an honest and sensible business opinion. The salary of the governorship was $8,000 a year, and the load of debt under which the Governor was staggering was more than a dozen times that sum; whereas a good lawyer in a live Ohio city ought to make $20,000 a year.

But Cleveland was the headquarters of the Hanna machine which was preparing to push McKinley into the presidential chair. The question, what was right, was not half so important at that juncture as the question, what was politically expedient. To retire from public life and become a plain provincial lawyer might be an eminently proper thing to do, but its effect would be to drop the flamboyant candidate back into his native obscurity. So another programme was decided on at Cleveland, and from its authors the Major took his cue. Not only did he cling to the governorship for the term he was then filling, but the summer of that year found him again on the stump, a contestant for a second term. Popular pity for his misfortunes was a chord whose strings his machine-managers knew well how to strike. The campaign was an eminent success, notwithstanding that the fruition of November presented a somewhat sordid contrast with the promise of February.

Mr. Kohlsaat has apparently learned his lesson, and no prophetic interviews have since been given out by him. It is the machine in this city which is grinding out all the authorized talk about McKinley nowadays.

III.

Surrender to the Street Railroads—Convicts Left in Idleness.

CLEVELAND, O., April 13.

How poor an administrator of his own business affairs Major McKinley has

shown himself was pointed out in a former letter. He has made an equal failure in dealing with public business. The four years of his administration as Governor were four years of financial embarrassment for Ohio. At the end of the first two years the State Treasury found itself with so big a deficit that it had to borrow $500,000 on short-term emergency certificates as the only alternative of confessed bankruptcy. The state constitution limits the borrowing of funds for paying running expenses to $750,000. Gov. McKinley's second term of two years has not compelled the state to trench upon the remaining $250,000 ; but every friend of the retiring Governor heaved a deep sigh of relief when the responsibility of nursing the damaged resources of the commonwealth devolved upon his successor, who is a good business man and has already secured legislation which he believes will bring the revenues abreast of the current expenses. Although, as has been said, Gov. McKinley's administration was spared the necessity of raising a second loan, it nevertheless left the Treasury without means of taking up its paper at maturity, and refunding operations are now in progress with a view to staving off the evil day for two years longer.

Of all her domestic corporations from which Ohio might derive a handsome income by taxation, the street railways in her thrifty cities, escape with the lightest burdens. At the two ends of the state are Cleveland, with her "big consolidated" and "little consolidated" systems of trolley and cable cars, and Cincinnati, with her notorious monopoly of a like sort. The "little consolidated" system of Cleveland, which is by far the richer of the rivals here, and will doubtless presently absorb the other, is controlled by "Mark" Hanna, the millionaire boss who is running McKinley for the presidency ; the attorney for the Cincinnati monopoly, who defends it from assault either in the courts or in the Legislature, is "Joe" Foraker, the factional leader on whose loyalty must largely hang the fate of Ohio's candidate at any national Republican convention.

An Ohio statute known as the "Nichols Law" provides for the taxation of telegraph, telephone and express companies, on the basis of the proportion their property in Ohio bears to their property elsewhere. When Senator Whittlesey, a shrewd and experienced farmer member, sought to increase the state's revenues by introducing in the Legislature a bill extending the Nichols Law so as to cover freight and equipment companies and street railways, he expected the cordial co-operation of Governor McKinley ; for he knew, and assumed that the Governor knew, the dire straits through which the state's finances were then passing. But the Governor never lifted a hand. "Mark" Hanna and "Joe" Foraker, though occasionally crossing swords in factional fights, had become a unit as soon as the street railways were threatened by a tax spectre, and poor Whittlesey could not stand up against such a combination. His bill disappeared from sight for a while, and when it emerged to make another struggle for enactment it still carried the freight and equipment companies, but the street railways had mysteriously dropped out!

Here was one of the opportunities of a lifetime missed by Gov. McKinley. Had he taken hold of Senator Whittlesey's bill, as he has always been ready to take hold of any means for advancing his own political interests, he would have enabled the state to make good its deficit and enjoy a surplus besides, and would have turned over to his successor a sound instead of a crippled treasury. The charge freely made by the Governor's critics that, inspired by Mr. Hanna, he had actively interested himself in inducing Senator Whittlesey to strike the street-railways item from the bill, does not call for consideration here, as no definite proofs have been published. Inaction by a public officer, however, at a time when it is his moral duty to act, is an offence often too serious to be distinguished from positive action of the wrong sort.

Another opportunity allowed to pass, whereby the state has been a loser, was that of employing the idle convicts in the Ohio penitentiary on public construction work which is badly in arrears and which is costing an immense sum in driblets. That the convicts are in need of such employment is the fault of the labor unions, who are powerful politically here as elsewhere. A few years ago they procured the enactment of a law forbidding the state to lease its convict labor to contracting manufacturers to an extent in excess of 5 per cent. of the amount of free labor employed at the same time in the same trades elsewhere in the state. Of course such a restriction has killed the profits of convict contracts both for the state and for the contractors. One manufacturing concern after another has declined to renew its contracts and dropped out of the prison shops: and to-day as a consequence about half the convict population of the state penitentiary is sitting within its walls, staring all day long at the whitewashed stones, with no occupation for minds or hands—a pitiful addition to the horrors of being locked up.

At least three of the public institutions in various parts of the state were in pro-

cess of building, extension, or repair during Gov. McKinley's administration. One of them, the Eastern Ohio Insane Hospital at Massillon, has been five years under way; another, the Epileptic Hospital at Gallipolis, eight or nine years. But the most inexcusable delay of all has been in connection with the intermediate penitentiary or reformatory at Mansfield, which has been twelve years in building, has cost $8,000,000 already, and is nowhere near finished yet. Besides outrageous extravagance from a pecuniary point of view, this involves the herding of young criminals, first offenders, in places morally unsuitable, so that there is every incentive for a conscientious executive to push the building to completion as fast as possible. It was suggested that Gov. McKinley could do a good and wise act by taking the unemployed convicts from the state penitentiary at Columbus and setting them at work on some of the unfinished buildings. The best place seemed to be Mansfield, where it was proposed to instruct the managers of the building operations to carry forward one wing far enough to make a place for at least a part of the first offenders, and then complete the rest by degrees as practicable. This would have been a master stroke in economy, besides sparing the able-bodied inmates of the penitentiary the misery of further idleness; and the convict labor law did not apply to public work. But the Governor paid no heed. Possibly he was too busy with his campaigning—for the universal criticism of his conduct during his four years is that he did more stumping than governing; or he may have hesitated to give offence to the labor leaders, who would have a share in electing party delegates, and who are intense in their opposition to all profitable employment of convicts —both in those ways prohibited by law, and in those against which they had not yet been able to procure legislation.

Fatal inaction as usual carried the day. Four of the twelve expensive years of the reformatory at Massillon were passed while Gov. McKinley sat in the chair of state, not caring, or not daring, to take the one course which had everything to recommend it.

IV.

The Governor's Office as a Street Railway Lobby Centre.

CLEVELAND, O., April 14.

GOV. MCKINLEY'S unfriendly attitude toward the Whittlesey bill to tax the street-railway companies would probably not have caused so widespread a suspicion of his motives, but for another incident of his administration affecting the same class of corporations.

The legislative session of 1892 was made memorable by the dramatic fiasco of the "ninety-nine-year bill." The municipalities of Ohio are now limited by law to a term of twenty-five years in granting franchises to street railways; the street-railway companies have been for years engaged in a constant struggle to have this term extended. Commonly their demand has been for fifty years; but in 1892, with Gov. McKinley just seated in the executive chair, they seem to have considered the time ripe for a bolder dash, and a Senator named Spencer introduced a bill which, stripped of its technical verbiage, would have authorized the conferring of franchises for ninety-nine years, without any compensating advantages to the people thus tied hand and foot.

So quietly did the machinery work that the matter would probably have escaped public notice till too late but for an accident. A certain newspaper correspondent at Columbus, looking through a heap of bills one evening in search of a topic for a letter, was struck with a peculiar incidental feature of this one, examined it carefully, and exploited his discovery in print the next day. At once the whole state was aroused. The unfettered newspapers in the cities, and the press of the small towns and villages universally, began pouring hot shot into the bill. The street-railway lobby responded by swarming about the capitol like bees in a sugar-cask. The bill was put through the form of amendment in committee, but the obnoxious feature was still there when it emerged with a favorable report.

The crisis came on the evening of April 7, when the bill was reached on the Senate calendar and put on its passage in that house. The excitement against the bill and its lobby was so great throughout the state that several of the Senators who had hopes of a political future felt under the necessity of explaining their votes and showing their constituencies how they had become "convinced" of the virtues of a ninety-nine-year franchise system. But not one of these men had the hardihood to claim that his vote had been solicited by anybody except persons financially interested in, or retained as attorneys by, the corporations involved.

On the other hand, the little group of Senators who had not been won over were outspoken in their denunciation of the methods used to convert their colleagues. Senator McMaken, for instance, described the social and political pressure which had been brought to bear in the interest of the bill, and said that nothing but his firm conviction that it went

against the interests of the people he represented would have enabled him to stand up against such powerful influences. Senator Forbes declared that for the two weeks last past it had been almost impossible to get into the Senate chamber, so thickly was the way blocked by the railway lobby; that the Senators had been individually pulled, hauled, and "manipulated" till it had become tiresome and disgusting; and that now the Senate was called upon to vote for a bill for the passage of which not a soul in the state of Ohio had asked except street-railway stockholders and similar interested parties. Senator Parker said that, although he felt sure that the decision of the Senate had already been "fixed" beyond the possibility of miscarriage, he considered it his duty to enter his protest against the grievous wrong which seemed imminent. The people of Ohio had pursued a mistaken and costly policy in the past in handling their street railways, and they must not go further in the same course, and tie their hands for almost a century, without a warning.

All these speeches, and others, were made to the face of Mark Hanna, who sat where he could watch every Senator in the critical hour. Then, at the proper moment, when the Senators of the majority who were too much ashamed of their votes to let them go unexplained had had a chance to put themselves on record, and before the pitiful minority could frighten their weak-kneed brethren with any more plain talk, Senator Phillips sprang the "previous question," and the bill was rushed through, 19 to 8.

The newspapers the next day took up the plain talk where the "previous question" had cut it off, and their charges remain the uncorrected record to this day. Said one: "It has leaked out that there was a secret conference of Senators interested in the passage of the ninety-nine-year bill held in the Governor's office last night. Among those present were: Bane, Eckley, Lampson, Abbott, Phillips and Nichols. It is a little hard to understand just why these gentlemen, neither of whom has a city of any size in his district, should take such deep interest in securing the passage of this infamous measure, which seeks to deed to wealthy corporations for ninety-nine years the prominent streets in all the towns and cities of the state. Of course it was impossible to ascertain what was done at this conference, but the fact that it followed immediately after the appearance here of one Mark A. Hanna is sufficient to create suspicion in the minds of a great many people who understand the influences that usually secure the passage of job laws through the General Assembly.

"There is a suspicion that Gov. McKinley has aided in securing the passage of the robber bill. At any rate, Mark Hanna made his headquarters in the executive office and sent for the Senators to appear in his presence. By ones and by twos they trotted down to see the Republican boss. Yesterday at noon two Senators who opposed the bill were in the Governor's office for an hour or more, where the street-railroad magnate labored with them, but he was unable to get them into line. However, a sufficient number were seen to pass the bill, and to-night the House membership is being checked off to ascertain if it is possible to railroad the job through that body."

The scandal which followed the Senate's share in this job, and the ugly things which were said of a Governor who would permit his office to be made a lobby headquarters, even to oblige an old friend and heavy political creditor, killed the ninety-nine-year bill in the House. Not enough Representatives could be found willing to face the charge of selling out to the street-railway companies to make its passage possible, and it was therefore discreetly smothered. But the scent of the whole business clung about the Governor's office and refused to be aired away during the rest of the four years of the McKinley régime. It is for that reason that so many worthy citizens of Ohio refuse to believe that Gov McKinley did not with his own hand strike the blow which cut the street railways so mysteriously out of the Whittlesey tax bill.

V.

The Hocking Canal Job and Its Closing Scandal.

CLEVELAND, O., April 15.

The unexplained collapse of the Whittlesey tax bill, and the failure to make use of idle convicts in finishing some of Ohio's public buildings, have been cited as single instances among many, illustrative of Gov. McKinley's utter lack of grasp when opportunities to benefit his state and distinguish his own administration were within easy reach of his hand; and the story of the "ninety-nine year bill," with its inglorious reflections upon the Governor, upon his bosom friend and backer Mr. Hanna, and upon the nineteen "convinced" Senators, has been told to illustrate the dramatic turn sometimes given to Gov. McKinley's blunders of incapacity and indiscretion if nothing worse. But the Hocking Canal case combines the elements of the other cases to effectively that no record of the McKinley quadrennium could afford to pass it by.

A section of the Hocking Canal lying chiefly in, or tributary to Athens County, Ohio, was found some years ago to be an unprofitable piece of property for the state to carry longer. Its usefulness as a commercial waterway had fallen off and it was chiefly valuable as a menace to the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Toledo Railroad Company in case the latter should exact inordinate freight rates or try other tricks which could be countered by timely competition on the part of the state government. In view of all the conditions, the sentiment of the business community throughout the state was strongly in favor of abandoning the section and leasing it at a good rental, so as to make it a steady source of revenue instead of a drain upon the Treasury.

Taking advantage of this popular feeling, certain thrifty gentlemen organized a company ostensibly for the purpose of building a railroad embracing the route of the abandoned canal section, to be known as the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Athens. It was a "paper" scheme at the outset. It still remains a "paper" scheme. The indications are that its projectors never intended it to be anything else. As the new road, if built, would parallel the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Toledo for most of the way, it was to be presumed that the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Toledo Company might wish to buy out the Columbus, Hocking Valley and Athens Company by giving it a handsome bonus on any bargain it might drive with the state. Indeed, there were many ways in which even a "paper" railroad with a valuable franchise in the Hocking Valley might come in handy.

At a low valuation, the lease of the abandoned canal would be worth, for legitimate railroad purposes, not less than $30,000 a year; for the tow path was wide enough for at least one pair of tracks, and the dry canal bed would afford space for more, and both were so level and so solid that the original work of grading and ballasting would be reduced to a minimum, and the cost of keeping in repair would be too insignificant to count.

But the new company was no prodigal. Besides being short of funds, it believed in getting the largest possible value at the lowest possible price. It accordingly procured the introduction in the Senate, two years ago, of a bill authorizing the lease of the abandoned canal to itself at an annual rental of $6,000 a year. It did not expect much opposition in the Senate, and its sense of security there was well founded; but the House, being closer to the masses of the people, was liable to make more trouble, and to forestall this contingency the company procured the energetic championship of Representative Sleeper, an active politician from Athens County, who kept his friendly eye on the leasing bill while it was in the Senate, and took personal command of its campaign when it reached the House. Mr. Sleeper assured everybody that he was not financially interested in the new railroad project; that his sole purpose in pushing it was to help build up an effective competitor with the old road and to furnish an outlet for some coal properties near his home which were still almost undeveloped. As the gentleman turned up, however, after the close of his legislative struggle, as general attorney for the new company, it is fair to suspect that he spoke with some mental reservations.

The newspapers set up a loud outcry at the insignificance of the rental offered as compared with the real value of the franchise, and demanded either that the rental named in the bill be multiplied by five at least, or that the bill provide for putting the franchise up at auction with a stiff upset price, and disposing of it to the highest bidder above that. On all hands the people interested in the state's welfare looked to Gov. McKinley to interfere in its behalf. "One blast upon his bugle horn" would have called into being a majority in either chamber of the Legislature. But once more he was a victim of administrative paralysis: his tongue was tied and his eyes were fixed. For lack of his support, the opponents of the job failed in their uphill fight. The most they could accomplish was to increase the rental to $10,000, with the stipulation that the rent for five years, or $50,000, should be paid in one lump and within sixty days, and that the railroad should be finished within two years.

On the night of the 17th of May, 1894, the bill, which had reached its final stage, was called up for passage in the House, and its foes were put to their trumps. They first procured from committee a report in favor of a substitute bill throwing the franchise open to competitive bids, each bidder to enclose a certified check for $1,000 as a guarantee of good faith, and the successful bidder to execute a bond in $100,000 for specific performance of contract; that was voted down. Then an offer was presented to the House from the Chicago, Columbus and Southern Railway Company, another new corporation controlled by responsible capitalists, of $15,000 annual rental, with $75,000 down; that was rejected also. By this time the blood of both factions had grown hot, and a dramatic scene followed. Charges and recriminations flew from side to side like the phrases of an antiphonal chorus. The climax was reached when one member arose and declared that there sat in the chamber at that moment a man who had called him over to a

sofa on one side and had offered him $5,000 in cash, "and all expenses paid," to change his vote. A roar of mingled anger, surprise, and disparagement rose from all quarters. In the midst of the hubbub the accusing member held his place undaunted, and as soon as he could command another hearing he stretched out his finger and pointed to a notorious lobbyist who had sneaked inside of the rail and was sitting beside another member and coaching him for the debate, and cried out:

"And there he sits, Mr. Speaker. I move his expulsion from this chamber!"

The uproar broke out afresh. The Speaker's gavel, pound as he would, could no more be heard than a tap on the window pane. There was no chance to put the motion, however; for before order could be restored the lobbyist, under protection of the Sergeant-at-Arms, had hurriedly slipped through the yelling crowd and sought refuge in the corridor.

It has been confidently asserted by those who are most conversant with the state annals that a scene at once so exciting and so disgraceful has never been witnessed in the Legislature of Ohio before or since that night.

But to the sequel. The Columbus, Hocking Valley and Athens Company did manage to raise the necessary money to pay its first installment, and later it bought some scrapers and other implements and turned up some earth. In that condition the job stands to-day. The two years' limit for completion of the work will expire in about one month. There is no new railroad. There is no "effective competition" with the old road. There is no development of new coal resources. All the state has to show for her bargain, and for the shame that was fastened upon her in its consummation, is $50,000 and a crop of annoying litigation! If she had accepted the better offer made her on the spot, she would have had $75,000 anyway, even if the litigation had come with it.

And what has Gov. McKinley to show for his lack of capacity, or disposition, or nerve to grasp this scandal and wipe it out of the four years' history of his governorship?

The loudest shouter for "McKinley for President" in the whole state of Ohio is a former Foraker man, Mr. Sleeper of Athens County.

VI.

The Eggleston Avenue Canal–Bed Job, Now Under Investigation.

CINCINNATI, O., April 16.

MOST of the blunders which make up the four years' period of inaction miscalled the "administration" of Gov. McKinley are traceable to his negative character. Having been in the habit for years of letting stronger men manage him, he naturally did not attempt to interfere when they proposed to manage the state of Ohio as well. His thirst for the presidency, too, has cost him all the self-confidence and independence of spirit which he might have cultivated but for this. Behind every tree he has seen an enemy whom he must placate; in every friendly advance he has seen an opportunity to tie one more man to him, which must not be jeoparded by haggling over favors that count for much to him who asks and cost the giver nothing.

One of these favors was asked some months ago, and a legislative committee is now engaged in an investigation to find out whether it was granted or not, for, if it was, it may have cost the grantor nothing, but the state of Ohio seems to have lost the annual interest on $200,000 somewhere in the operation.

In 1892, somebody with a gift for poring over old records called the attention of the Ohio Legislature to the fact that a branch of the Pennsylvania Railway Company was occupying with its tracks and buildings a part of Eggleston avenue in Cincinnati. This street was on the site of an abandoned section of the Miami and Erie Canal, and the state had granted it to the city for highway and sewerage purposes only; the railway company, however, had taken possession under an easement granted to it by the city, but without obtaining the state's consent. An inquiry was set on foot, the facts were obviously as stated, and the Attorney-General was accordingly directed to bring an action in quo warranto for the purpose of either ousting the railway company or compelling it to purchase the consent of the state to the existing diversion from the terms of the grant from state to city. Ex-Gov. Foraker and D. K. Watson, now a member of Congress, were retained as special counsel, and the Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the state, giving the railroad company 120 days in which to procure a lease from the state authorities.

The law of Ohio provides that a so-called joint board, consisting of the canal commission, the board of public works, and the chief engineer of the last-named body, shall execute such leases as this, using as a basis the valuation assessed by the canal commission, and charging the lessee an annual rental of six per cent. on such valuation. The canal commission set upon the street where the railroad company had its tracks and buildings a value of $357,000. The company, which was doing a business of perhaps $40,000 a year by the use of this bit of highway, and would have been driven to

its wits' end to know where else to settle down if compelled to remove thence, nevertheless made a spirited "bluff," and declared that it would tear up its tracks and go before it would submit to the imposition of such a rental. This bit of theatricals was a matter of course, and all who know the ways of railroad companies expected it. Imagine the astonishment, therefore, with which, just before the expiration of the 120 days, the public suddenly heard the announcement that the canal board's valuation had been cut down $200,000 at a single stroke, and that the railroad company had condescended to accept a lease on a revised valuation of only $157,000.

Astonishment soon gave way to indignation, for the state of Ohio, as has been shown, is not so rich that it can afford to throw six per cent. annual interest on $200,000 into the gutter; and indignation stirred up curiosity to discover how the thing was done. According to Frank J. McCullach, president of the board of public works, the person responsible for the change was the Attorney-General of the state, J. K. Richards, who was ex-officio the legal adviser of the joint board. There was only one member of the joint board who had the backbone to stand out and stick to the original valuation of $357,000. He was a member of the canal commission, named R. M. Rownd. Mr. McCullach says that he would not on any account have voted for the lease but for Mr. Richards's advice, and, knowing what he knows now, he would not vote so again.

Turning to the Attorney-General's latest annual report to see what explanation he offers for the change, we find no record of any. He gives a very circumstantial account of the proceedings before the courts, and a superficial statement of the conflicting claims of the railway company and the joint board as to the terms of the lease; but his record may be searched in vain for any reference to the $357,000 valuation and the mysterious disappearance of $200,000 of it in a night.

Is he ashamed of his share in the business? Does he think now, looking back upon it in cool blood, that he was weak in allowing the railroad to bluff the state out of more than half its annual income from the abandoned canal?

Or is he simply shielding another and higher functionary whose orders he was bound to respect? For the legislative investigators have only got to go deep enough to find:

(1.) That a letter was received by Gov. McKinley from J. Twing Brooks, the Second Vice President of the railway company, asking him if he would use his good offices to bring about the desired adjustment of the company's rental.

(2.) That after the receipt of this letter Gov. McKinley was seen to go into the Canal Commission's room, for an interview the nature of which either the Commissioners or the Governor would doubtless be willing to disclose, if it involved nothing questionable.

(3.) That thereafter the Attorney-General—who was both personally and officially as "close to" the Governor as any man in the public service—gave his fatal advice, on the strength of which the valuation suddenly dropped from $357,000 to $157,000.

These are facts which are known. There are several good people who can tell the investigators where to look for the original letter to the executive of an impoverished state from an executive of a railroad corporation then trying to drive a hard bargain with that state; but possibly the copy read by Mr. Brooks to the legislative investigating committee will answer just as well.

Judges of the nice proprieties of public life will form their own opinion of the personal or official relations which would justify such a letter, and of the interplay of cause and effect in the incidents which followed its receipt. For Gov. McKinley's letter to Mr. Brooks, in response to the one asking for his intervention, said that the matter had been placed entirely in the hands of the Attorney General, and that the Canal Commission would undoubtedly act in accordance with his advice!

The greatest interest is felt throughout the state in the forthcoming report of the investigation. The Democrats, with a lively recollection of the Blaine campaign, are already stowing away choice morsels of the evidence for use as material on the stump next fall.

VII.

How McKinley Workers are Paid from the State Treasury.

COLUMBUS, O., April 17.

IF the four years of Gov. McKinley's so-called "administration" in Ohio show a record of feebleness, neglect, and subservience to rings and lobbies in connection with the state's financiering, they are positively disreputable in another light; for the Governor proved himself not only nerveless and ineffective in dealing with any important public question, but unable to choose men for appointment who could keep clear of scandals. If he had left in their places all the executive officers who were already in the service when he took his chair, or if he had, in making changes, sought only those whose approved service under former governors had given them a title

to his consideration, he could have steered clear of many of the perils which beset his course, and gone out of the governorship with a record fit for a candidate for the presidency. But instead of that he had a general clearing-out, reorganizing offices and staffs and boards and commissions till he had "McKinleyized" practically the whole state government, with results which proved his incapacity for exercising the power of appointment and removal.

Indeed, the first cases which occur to mind are those of one new appointee and one hold-over. The new appointee was the governor's personal choice for a high place on his military staff; he retired after the newspapers had associated his name with a domestic scandal of which the details would not edify the refined readers of the *Evening Post*, and which it would be better to dismiss with this brief reference. The hold-over—almost, if not quite, the only person in a highly responsible office whom McKinley saw fit to keep in his place—was W. Z. McDonald, chief inspector of workshops and factories. It is the duty of this functionary to inspect all buildings in which large numbers of persons are housed, and pass upon their safety and the sufficiency of their sanitary equipment. As an officer, McDonald made himself unpopular by his zeal in insisting on supplying all sorts of buildings with fire-escapes. He marred the architecture of many pretentious hotels, and added considerably to the expense of various manufacturing plants by this means, and the proprietors whose pockets felt the pinch reviled him as a "fire escape fiend," and threw out broad hints that he received a commission from dealers in safety appliances. In view of the excellence of the end gained, however, no attention was paid to this grumbling. But one fine day the capital city was startled by the story that McDonald had been drawing money from the state treasury on fraudulent warrants, and the accused officer was arrested and brought to trial.

It was a queerly-mixed lot of evidence which was brought out for both prosecution and defence; so much so that the jury disagreed and no further proceedings were taken, McDonald having made good some $4,000, responsibility for which seemed to have been fixed upon him. It appeared that he had eleven deputies serving under him, who divided their time between official and political work. They had been active, as he had been also, in helping to elect Gov. McKinley and other Republican candidates to office. Money was needed to keep the machine running, and these fellows contributed with the rest. For their expenses they were expected to make a regular accounting to their chief, who in turn would draw the money from the state treasury. Between accepting oral statements of the expenses of his subordinates, instead of vouchers, and keeping run in his head of the amounts he advanced to them for the payment of the political assessments, McDonald's accounts became a hopeless tangle, and all attempts to straighten them before a jury made the political scandals of his administration thicker. At the same time it became plain to all who followed the testimony that his own bank account did not profit by his irregularities, but that he was the victim of a rotten sort of partisanship which permeated the higher politics of Ohio—a convenient scapegoat on whom bigger men could heap their own responsibilities. It was sympathy for his situation as a vicarious martyr which undoubtedly had most to do with the disagreement of the jury, and it was the dread of raking over more administration scandals which prompted the dismissal of the case after one mistrial.

How did Gov. McKinley act in the premises? Did he, as soon as it became clear that McDonald had got into trouble by over-zeal in working for his election, call off the prosecution? Or did he demand of McDonald his immediate retirement from an office which he had abused?

Neither, so far as is known. But he had an interview with McDonald at the capitol, which McDonald began to describe on the witness-stand.

"Did the Governor say to you, 'I want your resignation right away'?" asked the attorney who was drawing the story out.

"No, sir; he said nothing of the sort," answered the witness.

The audience strained their ears for the revelation which was coming—but it never came. Counsel on both sides suddenly reached the conclusion not to probe any further, and the record of McDonald's interview with the Governor remains unwritten to this day.

That McDonald did not suffer in his personal reputation by the disclosures made in court and by his admitted shortage, is evident from the fact that he is to day employed as a responsible "travelling man" at good pay. The chief sufferer by the whole business was the Governor himself; for the inquiry was at once raised: If the Governor knew nothing of what this man had been doing, why did he single him out as an exception to the "clean sweep" made of the other state officers? Or, on the other hand, if the Governor knew of his proceedings before they were made generally public, why did he not remove him at once? And in any event, why was not the McDonald-McKinley interview described in its entirety in court, when the good name of

the administration had so much at stake? Another investigation which has recently been made discloses the fact that "Joe" Smith, Gov. McKinley's State Librarian, instead of staying in Columbus and managing the library—the duty for which he draws his salary—has been spending his time in Cleveland, helping "Mark" Hanna engineer the McKinley campaign. When these disclosures came out, they simply reduced to a formal record a matter which was already known to all Ohio, and a subject of general comment. The disclosure evoked no expression of public indignation, but merely laughter. Such things had become so common under the McKinley regime that they had passed the stage where they exited any feeling except amusement.

"Bill" Hahn is another excellent specimen of the McKinley lieutenant who draws his sustenance from the State Treasury. Hahn was formerly a member of the Board of Public Works, and, while he was still under fire on account of sundry grants of canal lands made to railroad companies during his membership of the board, Gov. McKinley put him at the head of the State Insurance Department. This appointment was regarded as significant that McKinley needed some active political work outside of his own state, for the duties of the office would call Hahn elsewhere to examine the affairs of foreign insurance companies doing a branch business in Ohio. Sure enough, it was of one of these "official" excursions to New York city, that an Ohio journalist wrote from there to his home paper in September of last year:

"Mr. Hahn's labors have not been confined to talking McKinley. He has also been working the press and has managed to get a good deal of the right kind of stuff for McKinley into print here. In all this he is understood to be carrying out his part of a regular organized effort to boom the Ohio Governor, and obtain for him the nomination so much desired by him and his friends. This scheme . . . is one which has been tried before many a time, but never with great results. It is a simultaneous booming of McKinley in all parts of the country, with a claiming of strength that it is supposed will drive all other prospective candidates to cover."

It is plain that Mr. Hahn knew what Gov. McKinley had appointed him for.

VIII.

Demoralization in the Conduct of Lunatic Asylums and Penitentiaries.

COLUMBUS, O., April 18.

THE history of penal and charitable institutions of Ohio during McKinley's governorship is a long story of scandals and investigations. It is useless to say that the Governor was not himself in charge of all these institutions. The point is that he reorganized their management; and his mind was evidently set so much more upon making his appointments tributary to his presidential aspirations than upon doing well the duty right at hand, that he appointed trustees and managers who were unfit for their places, if general demoralization is any sign.

At the Dayton State Hospital for the Insane, for instance, an inmate named George Smith died mysteriously, and was hastily buried. Some of his friends were not satisfied, and a coroner's inquest was held, with the result of showing that he had died after being brutally beaten and kicked. Several of his ribs were broken. The attendants promptly placed the blame upon other inmates of violent tendencies, and from the nature of things it was impossible to get satisfactory evidence on the subject; but nobody could give a sufficient reason why, if the poor creature had come to his death from causes which the asylum management could not have controlled, the facts had not been frankly made known in the first place and taken out of their atmosphere of scandalous mystery. How little faith was placed in explanations which failed to explain, was shown by the prompt revival of the stories of cruelty and broken bones after the death of another inmate, Michael Knecht, who went into the record as a victim of pneumonia, and whose body was buried in the asylum grounds. What seemed to outsiders a pretty sure sign of crooked work in this case, was the summary discharge of Knecht's attendant by the superintendent. But inquiry into this scandal was put off by the superintendent's falling seriously ill and being unable to testify.

The purchase of supplies for the State Hospital for the Insane at Toledo from "friendly" dealers, the extraordinary postage account of the Labor Statistician, charges of grievous cruelty at the Boys' Industrial School at Lancaster, and the freedom with which the inmates of the State Hospital for the Insane at Columbus were permitted to make exhibitions of themselves to the annoyance of the sane people living in the neighborhood, were only a few of the matters aired by investigating committees and the press; and all tended to discredit the state administration, so that good citizens without regard to party cried out in despair: "If Gov. McKinley would only give up campaigning for the presidency long enough to attend to the needs of Ohio!"

The Penitentiary at Columbus was one of the institutions which furnished the largest crop of scandals. Escapes of con-

victs became suspiciously frequent; and a murderer named Elliott was blinded by vitriol thrown in his face by another prisoner whose plot to escape he had helped to frustrate — though how the vitriol had been smuggled into the convict's possession nobody seemed able to find out. The first penitentiary chaplain under McKinley's governorship retired from service after being charged with immoralities not necessary to rehearse here. The second went out also under a cloud, the result of certain financial transactions with convicts. He took charge of convicts' money for them; he also had to sign recommendations for paroling convicts for good behavior. Accusations began to fly about that he did not always return to the convicts all the money he obtained from or for them. An investigation was made, and, though he was able to explain a good many of his operations, he nevertheless admitted to the board of inquiry that he had committed a grave indiscretion in borrowing money from prisoners upon whose applications for parole he would have to pass; and his resignation was tendered and accepted without more ado.

Owing to these two successive scandals in so rapid succession, greater pains was apparently taken with the choice of a third chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Winget, for he still holds the place. But it must have been a great discomfort to him, if at all sensitive to the association in which his name appears in print, to be drawn into such a spectacle as was presented one Sunday, and which is cited here not because it is unique, or highly important in itself, but as illustrative of the sort of discipline maintained in the state institutions under the governorship of a weak-kneed, vacillating politician.

A deputy warden named Playford was going to leave the service on Monday, his successor having been appointed and broken in. There having been some rivalry between Playford and the warden as to who was the more popular with the convicts (!), the retiring deputy had arranged with the chaplain to allow him to make a farewell speech in connection with the weekly religious exercises. The warden, however, had got wind of this plan, and was informed also that a large bouquet had been smuggled into the prison, which, at the close of Playford's speech, was to be presented to him by a leading convict, with appropriate remarks, as a testimonial of the affection with which "the boys" would ever cherish his memory. The next day, of course, the newspapers would print an account of the whole affair, and the retiring deputy would be one point ahead of the warden in his reputation for popularity in their prison world. The warden was resolved to break up the show and spoil its theatrical effect. As will be seen, he succeeded simply in turning a roaring farce into a somewhat gory melodrama.

The chaplain finished his discourse and signalled to Playford, who stepped forward with a bow and began his prepared address to the convicts, in the presence of Warden James, an assistant deputy warden named Stackhouse, the warden's son, Curry, the other penitentiary employees, and a large number of philanthropic ladies and gentlemen who were in the habit of visiting the penitentiary chapel on Sunday. But instead of attempting to describe the scene which followed in the language of an ordinary chronicle, let us get its picturesque flavor —the "local color," as it were—from the lips of Mr. Playford himself, as he made his statement to the police:

"After singing and prayer," said he, "the chaplain beckoned to me to get up. I got up and said: 'Boys, don't you wish you were me?' I was going to say, 'as I retire to-morrow night,' but before I could utter these words the warden jumped up and grabbed me by the left arm and said: 'Sit down!' I replied, 'Warden, I have the permission of the chaplain to make a few remarks for the benefit of the service.' Again he said, 'Sit down!' and beckoned to Stackhouse.

"Stackhouse jumped to his feet and grabbed me by the left arm, with his club raised, and jerked me round in presence of the visitors, hurting me by wrenching my side. He dragged me over the feet of several lady visitors, when I said: 'Stackhouse, let go of me! You are hurting me.' He raised his cane in the air, and being so much larger than I, weighing about 250 pounds and being over six feet tall and powerfully built, I feared he would hit me with his cane. I then let go my right, and caught him below the right eye in the angle of the nose, knocking him over against the annex prisoners, who sat on the platform. He recovered himself and raised his club to hit me, when I clinched him to save myself, and we fell down three steps of the platform to the floor. He fell partly on me. I grabbed him and twisted him till his back was towards me.

"By that time the new deputy, five guards, and the warden's son, Curry, rushed around us. Curry shouted to Stackhouse, 'Give it to him!' I jumped to my feet and exclaimed: 'If any of you come at me, I'll do you as I did Stackhouse.' I would not hit Curry, as he is not worth hitting."

All this in a chapel devoted to divine worship, on the day consecrated to the Prince of Peace, and in the presence of some hundreds of convicts, kept under lock and key and branded for life because

they have raised violent hands against their neighbors!

Warden James's version of the affair, and that given by other participants and witnesses, did not differ materially from Playford's, though lacking some of the rare moral aroma which pervaded his. The press, irrespective of party, denounced the whole business as a public shame and disgrace. And yet it was only typical of the management of the penal institutions of Ohio during McKinley's administration as Governor. Is it wonderful that their condition became so intolerable at last that, even in this politics-ridden state, a project was soberly broached and discussed of putting the penitentiary system under a non-partisan board of managers, in the hope of fumigating it?

IX.

Cruelty and Incapacity at the Deaf-mute Asylum.

COLUMBUS, O., April 20.

IN the last letter some typical instances were cited to show the demoralization into which the penal and charitable institutions of Ohio lapsed during the rule of Major McKinley as Governor, thanks to his poor appointments in reorganizing the personnel of the state government. It is not given to any man to do always the right thing; but the only man fit to be trusted with power is he who, having made one serious blunder, does not invite its repetition by following the same course a second time. Major McKinley, unhappily, is one of those persons on whom the lessons of experience are thrown away. Take for an example the case of the superintendents of the State Institution for the Deaf and Dumb in Columbus.

The law of Ohio—section 647 of the Revised Statutes—requires that these superintendents "shall be persons of acknowledged skill, ability, and experience in their profession, and of good moral character." A carefully prepared opinion of the Attorney General construes this to mean that, besides his other accomplishments, a superintendent shall be able to understand and use the sign language of the deaf mutes. In spite of the law, reinforced by the plainest dictates of common sense, the first superintendent appointed after Gov. McKinley had set his reorganization programme in motion was one S. R. Clark. He had not been long in command before reports began to circulate that the children at the institution were ill treated. The accusations presently became so definite that they could no longer be ignored, and an official investigation was ordered. In the early part of 1894 the investigating committee made its report. Although his relations with his immediate superiors, as will be seen later, were such as to cause the most charitable possible view to be taken of the superintendent's conduct, the committee was compelled to make several painful admissions. Among other things, it found that he was a cruel martinet in dealing with trifling acts of stupidity on the part of the pupils. On one occasion three of the girls, being a little late for a meal, thought to take a short cut to their seats by entering the dining-room through the main door instead of the door which the rules required the children to use. Clark rushed at them, seized one of the party by her arm or shoulder, and turned her about so suddenly that her head struck the door-casing and her face was badly bruised.

For such petty infractions of the rules as leaving table without permission, entering library without permission, or congregating in a hall, Clark applied or threatened violent punishment, which so terrorized the helpless children that one, in trying to flee at his approach, took a bad fall and was injured.

The tables were at times insufficiently supplied with meats, or too liberally supplied with bad butter; competent and experienced teachers and employees were dismissed without cause; and a law requiring that the girls should be taught how to make wearing apparel was flatly violated. These examples show the wide range of the offences reported by the committee as proved. The committee took pains to point out that, if the superintendent had had the acquaintance with the deaf-mute sign language which the law called for, he might have avoided much friction in his relations with the pupils, as they could have understood his orders and he could have understood their excuses. But he was found guilty finally of an offence which mere ignorance could not condone. The yearly allowance of public money for running the institution was based upon the superintendent's report of the general average of attendance, and the committee found that Clark had put in a voucher for 435, whereas the actual figures were only 375. So Clark had to go. But so reluctant were the board of trustees to part with him that, in accepting his resignation, they took pains to say that they did so "not because of any lack of confidence in his work as superintendent, * * * but because circumstances beyond our control left us no other course to pursue." And they emphasized this friendly sentiment by making him a handsome present as a souvenir of his brief administration.

For a month after Clark's retirement, the politicians swarmed about the Governor's room, trying to capture the vacant superintendentship for one or another favorite. Among other influences brought to bear, was that of the Republican Glee Club, which had done yeoman work in the last preceding McKinley campaign.

The club pressed as a candidate one of its own members named Ellis, who had once served a term as steward of the institution. The confidence of the club that it had sung itself into a position of authority with the Governor, where it could name the head of a great state charity, is, perhaps, a sufficient commentary on the way Major McKinley's fellow-partisans looked upon his use of patronage as Governor. Indeed, back of everything else to be considered in this connection lies the fact that the law vests the selection of the superintendent in the board of trustees; yet the board's own candidate, a professor in the institution named Odebrecht, stood no better chance for the place than any political "boomer." It was this way with all appointments under the McKinley régime, down almost, if not quite, to the charwomen who scrubbed the floors of the public buildings: the Governor's hand was in everything, no matter where the law placed the right of selection, and to the Governor all petitions and appeals for patronage were addressed.

To return to the Glee Club. When its committee visited the Governor to urge the appointment of Ellis, they found that they were too late. The Governor told them that he was sorry to seem unaccommodating, but he had already given his word in favor of the Rev. W. S. Eagleson, an applicant for the recent vacancy in the penitentiary chaplainship. It having been necessary to refuse the reverend gentleman's request in that quarter, it was of course desired to give him "something equally as good," and the place of superintendent of the Institution for the Deaf and Dumb seemed to fill the bill pretty well!

A little later came the trustees. They pointed out to the Governor that Prof. Odebrecht met all the legal requirements for a superintendent, and had in addition a familiarity with this particular institution and its inmates which would obviate the need of such a breaking-in as must be given to a new man. The Governor answered that, while all they said might be true, he considered Mr. Eagleson a very superior person, who would soon adapt himself to the duties of superintendent. The trustees replied that Mr. Eagleson might be morally and intellectually all he was represented to be, but that he did not know the deaf-mute language, which was by law a *sine qua non*, and had had no special training in this field of educational work. They recalled to the Governor's mind the very bad blunder that had been made in appointing Mr. Clark, who gave as good promise as Mr. Eagleson, and, like him, was ignorant of the sign language, to his own cost and that of the institution; they thought it would make a bad impression, and tend to destroy public confidence in the management of the institution, to do again what had been done with so sorry a result in the Clark case.

Within twenty-four hours the scramble for the place was ended by the announcement that Mr. Eagleson was appointed. The way this consummation came about was characteristic. The trustees had met and heard the report of their committee, when a messenger appeared at the board-room with a request from the Governor that two of the trustees—two who were regarded as uncertain, and who held the balance of power—would call upon him at once at his hotel. They did so, and on their return there was nothing left for the board to do but to ratify the Governor's mandate and select Mr. Eagleson by formal vote. The legal requirement as to his acquaintance with the sign language was evaded by giving him until the following August—three months—to "study up" the subject under a private tutor!

This wretched subterfuge cost the reverend gentleman a vast amount of hard work for a very small return; for, one year after he had thus fitted himself for his post, he was obliged to quit it, owing to a quarrel in which he had become involved with the matron.

X.

The Campaign of Noise—A Specimen Touter.

CLEVELAND, O., April 22.

THE McKinley campaign, as has been said, is strictly a "brass-band" affair. The idea of making a great noise, and thus frightening the timid delegates and driving rival candidates from the field unless they have uncommonly good nerves, was the product of "Mark" Hanna's ingenuity. Hanna knows the sort of human material with which he has to deal. That his plan is effective, at least in spots, is shown by the sort of letters which are coming to leading Republicans in Ohio from lesser lights of the party in other states. A typical case is that of a Kentuckian who wrote some time ago to a prominent business man in this state. "I want to be internal revenue collector for my district," said he, "and I am in need of advice. Gov.

Bradley is an old and valued friend of mine, and if I could do what I wanted I would support him for President. But everything I hear is 'McKinley.' J. S. was through here lately, fresh from Ohio, and he says that every delegate who doesn't come out for McKinley now is going to be blacklisted. I am a delegate, and I don't know what to do."

Luckily, he was dealing with an honest man, who answered: "Stick to Bradley. Then you will be sure of his good-will if he has the distribution of the patronage in your state. If you come out for McKinley now, you will be only one of a crowd, and neither candidate will remember you when the time comes."

Every Ohioan to whom this was repeated bore witness that the advice was good, not only because founded on a wholesome principle of loyalty, but because Major McKinley's memory—after election — is notoriously treacherous. There are not wanting those good Republicans who accuse him of forgetfulness at an earlier stage, as, for instance, at the Minneapolis convention of 1892, when a candid word from him at a critical juncture would have released the Ohio delegation from their hypocritical bondage to himself and enabled the Harrison men to go where they belonged. As it was, he made them play the inane part of the chorus in the old Greek drama—they insisting that he should accept the honor of the nomination, while he stood up behind the chairman's desk, and virtuously protested in a gentle voice that his own choice was Harrison. For that piece of spectacular fol-de-rol, following immediately after a series of events which convinced everyone of his willingness to have the nomination forced upon him, McKinley has never been forgiven by the friends of General Harrison, and with reason. The whole performance was as empty as the excuses with which he dodged the challenge of Col. McClure of Pennsylvania, a month later, to take part in a joint debate on the tariff. McKinley's successes in the political field have never been won by hard logic, but by the stampede process, just as his votes while the leader of the House in the Fifty-first Congress were won by the application of the "previous question" gag rule and the sharp cracks of the party whip. The campaign-chest is always well in evidence also, and the rich people who have had something to gain by his election have never failed to keep it full. Eighty-five thousand dollars is the figure set here upon the campaign fund raised for his first election to the governorship, contributed by Eastern manufacturers and other "business" constituents who already had him in training for the presidency.

A sensation has been caused within the last few days by the publication, in a Columbus paper which has repeatedly given McKinley the most loyal support, of the announcement that the men who held minor offices in this state under his governorship were to be assessed $25 each for the expenses of this year's canvass. The article proceeds:

"Some idea of the magnitude of the call may be obtained when it is considered that altogether there are about eight hundred officials, clerks, and "sich" who owe their employment to the Governor more or less directly. . . . As a matter of course these persons are not compelled to pay the money. They are simply asked to do so to assist the cause, but, being asked, the great majority of them will feel in duty bound to respond. If a number respond, proportionate to the number who respond in the state campaigns, this horizontal assessment will produce about $20,000.

The need of money to run this campaign must be very pressing indeed, if the clerks must be taxed at so early a stage, when the only expense that can be incurred is that of "working up" delegations to St. Louis. It seems as if the candidate ought to look for this preliminary fund to some of the multitude of wealthy friends whose loyalty is exploited so persistently in the McKinley press. There is "Mark" Hanna himself, whose street-railroad interests owe so much to Major McKinley's forbearance, if not to his friendly coöperation, as Governor. And there is "Ves" Everett, whom Hanna has put upon the Ohio delegation as his confidential friend. The New York *Tribune* referred to Everett the other day as "a prominent banker of Cleveland." The writer of the *Tribune* article would have been more strictly correct if he had referred to this gentleman as a retired capitalist, for the Cleveland directories give his name and his residence in the most gorgeous part of Euclid Avenue, without attaching any occupation thereto.

It is true that Everett was a banker once. That was back in the seventies. The firm was Everett, Weddell & Co. Everett was credited with being the moving spirit of the concern, and Weddell the ornamental partner, with a snug fortune but little practical knowledge of the business. One day there came an awful crash. The creditors seized on everything in sight. So much of Weddell's property as would realize anything went to pay the debts of the firm, together with money put up by some friend of Everett's, generally understood to be a rich relative by marriage. Weddell retired from public view, utterly ruined in fortune; what became of the "Co." does not appear; but Everett, always buoyant

and debonair, soon rose to the crest of the wave again. Hanna has apparently never lost faith in him, and has put him into this and that place, sometimes in the banking line and sometimes elsewhere. Just now he has him in street railroads and politics, while Everett is interested on his own account as a "promoter" of various gigantic enterprises scattered around the country.

Everett is "smart," in the Western sense. Even the neighbors who lower their voices when they rehearse his variegated experiences as a financier are ready to admit that. He has a most attractive way, too, of forgiving—or appearing to forgive—those quondam friends who have played football publicly with his fair name. This makes people speak of him as "popular" as well as smart.

Indeed, his popularity has always been one of his strong points. Once, while he was poor Weddell's senior partner, he was so popular that, though a Republican, he was elected City Treasurer on both party tickets at once. There are malicious politicians who account for this phenomenon by saying that the Democrats nominated him out of esteem for his magnanimity as shown in contributing more money to their campaign fund than to that of the Republicans. However that may be, he was elected term after term, till it began to be wondered whether nobody else in Cleveland was fitfor the place.

One secret of his long continuance in office was, without doubt, his clever handling of the city securities. When the city issued a new batch of bonds, they would be turned over to Everett to dispose of, and, when any of the money was needed, Everett furnished it. That was highly satisfactory to the public, for it saved them a lot of trouble in watching where the bonds went to, or where the money came from, or on what terms the city dealt with its creditors. As long as the money was always on tap when needed, what folly to bother the taxpayers' heads with details!

But one day a local banker—the old inhabitants say it was John F. Whitelaw, now president of the National City Bank—conceived the idea of throwing a little light on these operations. So he prepared an ordinance, which the Common Council enacted, requiring that the city's securities should thereafter be put up for competitive bids and sold at the highest figure offered. Everett stoutly resisted the new order of things, but he was compelled to surrender, and the wisdom of the competitive plan was shown by the fact that about $16,000 was saved to the city on a single issue of a quarter-million dollars' worth of bonds. Not long thereafter the treasurership seemed to lose its attraction for Everett, and he passed into private life.

It is not the writer's purpose to single out this one financier for especial distinction. His career is reviewed here simply because he is "Mark" Hanna's right-hand man, and a McKinley oracle whom the *Tribune* seems to love to quote. He is doubtless no worse and no better than other people Hanna makes useful for blowing the McKinley campaign trumpets, and whom he will "take care of" after he has elected his little President.

Where would "Ves" fit best in the next administration? As a "prominent banker of Cleveland," how would he do, say, for Comptroller of the Currency when James H. Eckels steps out?

XI.

The Indictment Summarized—A Pitiful Prospect.

CLEVELAND, O., April 23.

THE sole aim of this series of letters has been to present a faithful portrait of Major McKinley as his lifelong neighbors in Ohio see him. That it is only an outline sketch is partly the fault of its subject, who is only an outline statesman, and partly the result of there being so great a mass of material of the same sort to draw upon, that it is practicable to cite only typical cases. It does not straighten the crooked lines in this picture, or lighten its heavy strokes, to say that it does not leave Major McKinley under indictment for positive and aggressive wrong-doing. To the extent that it does not attempt to make him out a criminal and an outlaw, this is true. The complaint against him, admitted freely by Ohioans who are most friendly to him personally, is that he is ignorant of the fundamental principles of business, a shifty politician, and a weak and nerveless executive. The only strong trait for which his neighbors give him credit is an inordinate ambition to become President of the United States. That one idea appears to have dominated his whole life ever since "Mark" Hanna began to make use of him as a candidate; and it has warped and unfitted him for doing his duty to himself or to the trusts his state has committed to his keeping.

In our rapid panorama of his career for four years, we have seen him frightened into a pitiful paralysis of tongue and pen when urged to make plain his position on the silver question at a critical time. We have seen him leaning, for his main support as a presidential candidate, upon a false and hollow pretense of having his own state behind him. We have seen him go down under a load of another man's debts in which he would not have become entangled but for his

lack of ordinary business sense. We have seen him trading upon a credit which proved itself chiefly wind, since his own means would not meet a respectable fraction of the obligations with which he had loaded himself, and he had no settled income. We have seen that, instead of quitting politics and going to work—the only course which his frank friend Mr. Kohlsaat thought practicable for a bankrupt who proposed to pay his debts himself—he allowed a group of his rich backers to "pass the hat" and pay his debts for him. We have seen him in the Governor's chair, letting the state of Ohio run a half-million dollars into debt for mere current expenses, while he devoted his attention to his presidential prospects. We have seen him ignore the need of replenishing the state treasury, when his best friends wanted his aid in passing the Whittlesey tax bill. We have seen him equally oblivious of his present duty when his help was most needed, in the case of the Hocking Canal lease, with the consequence that the state lost $25,000 at a single stroke, and the chance of an improved yearly rental at a later date. We have seen him manifest an active interest in only one of the state's financial operations, which resulted in leasing to a railroad corporation a piece of public property on a valuation of $157,000, though it was valued by the lawful authority at $357,000. We have seen him permitting the use of the Governor's room in the capitol as a camping-ground for his friend and backer, the chief street-railway magnate of the state, when a bill was pending to secure street-railway franchises for ninety-nine years, and a number of legislators had to be "convinced" before the vote. We have seen demoralization pervading the state government in every department during his exercise of the appointing power, and the atmosphere of the prisons and asylums saturated with scandal.

It is no apology for such a record to say that Gov. McKinley never ran his own hand into the state treasury to enrich himself; it is the business of a Governor to keep the hands of other men out, also. It is no excuse for McKinley's incapacity that the Governor of Ohio has no veto power under the constitution; he has at hand other means for advancing good and blocking bad legislation, as the records of several of McKinley's predecessors in office show. It is not enough to plead, as a reason for promoting a Governor to the presidency, that the scandals which made his term as Governor memorable were not so huge as some which have blackened the pages of other histories; petty sins are too often associated with petty virtues, and a long list of them stamps their perpetrator as a petty man and a petty public officer, far below the standard of character and ability which our republic has set for its chief executive.

The half-measure quality which pervades all that Major McKinley does and is, can certainly not be considered a recommendation for the presidency. The same craving which has paralyzed his best energies while a first term has been in sight would undoubtedly dominate him in the hope of a second. The same lack of sturdy independence which has always made him a toy in the hands of stronger men would keep him under their control as President, especially in view of the additional obligations incurred in his campaign. What could be more edifying than to see the daily gazette of appointments bristling with the old, familiar names: "Mark" Hanna for Premier, with power to plunge the nation into war to-day and coo the sweet notes of peace to-morrow, according to whether the markets needed a bear or a bull impulse; "Ves" Everett to manage the Treasury and dispose of the bonds; Richards for Attorney General, to advise the government how it could most effectively cut down its sources of revenue; "Bill" Hahn for Secretary of the Interior, with the largest cabinet patronage to handle; Sleeper for Interstate Commerce Commissioner, to see that that unbuilt railroad in Athens County gets its share of whatever is "going 'round"; "Joe" Smith for Librarian of Congress, with leisure to run a second-term literary bureau; and Eagleson for Superintendent of the Coast Survey, with three months' leeway to "get up" the necessary mathematical knowledge.

Although this list of possible appointees must be only imaginary at the present stage, the experience of the state of Ohio under McKinley's administration suggests that something quite as grotesque might be in store for the whole Union if he became President. The pressure for favors would begin with the big men to whom the ex-Governor is over his ears in debt, and end with the little fellows who feel in need of a "vindication"—and a salary. If the lessons of the past furnish any basis for prophecy, the officer who stood at the focus of this pressure would be unable to resist it, and the air of Washington would soon become as thick with "deals" and "combines" and "schemes" as the air of Columbus was from January, 1892, to December, 1895. Knowing what they do of their candidate, can we wonder that the most intelligent Republicans of Ohio, and even leading members of the delegation to St. Louis, still refuse to believe that the national convention will let McKinley stampede it?

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